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DEFINING QUALITY EDUCATION AS A GOVERNMENT 
INTEREST:  THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S REFUSAL TO “PLAY 
NICE” WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, CONGRESS, STATE 
SUPREME COURTS, AND THE COMMUNITY VOICE 
Tiffani N. Darden* 
 
The Court’s equal protection doctrine threatens No Child Left Behind’s mandate to close the 
achievement gap and the U.S. Department of Education’s renewed vigor to enforce civil rights, and the 
execution of many state constitutional education clauses.  School districts committed to quality 
education must overcome the Court’s severely limited tolerance for racial classifications—a challenge 
compounded by budget deficits, demographic shifts, requirements to use social science data, and the 
effects of socioeconomic status.  While state and federal governing bodies have reached a consensus to 
improve educational quality using protected classifications, the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
doctrine hampers achieving this goal because policy makers must work within ambiguous and 
conflicting boundaries. Since 2009, in response to the Court’s anticlassification tenor, school districts 
in Washington, Louisiana, and Indiana, approved magnet school programs.  However, they have 
scrounged for money to fund this race-neutral alternative to diversity.  Last year, New Mexico passed 
the first Hispanic Education Act aimed to close the achievement gap between Latino students and their 
nonminority peers.  Not long thereafter, Wake County, N.C., dismantled its socioeconomic integration 
policy.  Applying the Court’s tiered scrutiny analysis, a court may hold New Mexico’s legislation 
unconstitutional and foreclose judicial remedies to Wake County parents opposing the board’s decision.  
In stark contrast, the Department of Education supports New Mexico’s Hispanic Education Act and 
publically admonished Wake County school board for its actions.  In this Article I propose that the 
Supreme Court recognize quality education, as defined by state constitutional education clauses, to be a 
government interest sufficient to justify the use of protected classifications.  Accepting quality education 
as a government interest will honor Brown v. Board of Education’s antisubordination legacy, create 
needed continuity in education law, promote deference to local officials and the democratic process, and 
temper the Court’s colorblind ideology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The language, standards, and knowledge base adapted to under-
stand and communicate advancements in education policies have 
outpaced the federal equal protection doctrine applied to examine 
their constitutionality.  According to most state constitutions, the 
government’s obligation is to provide a quality, not an equal, educa-
tion for all children.1  Education scholars endorse the consideration 
of multiple traits, such as race, socioeconomic status, family educa-
tional background, and social conditions of a student population 
when analyzing the quality or adequacy of educational policies.2  
 
 1 See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights:  Conceptual Convergence in 
School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 327 (2011) (noting that “litigants 
began to focus their theories of state constitutional harm on the quality of education in a 
state, rather than on its mere equality”); Josh Kagan, A Civics Action:  Interpreting “Adequacy” 
in State Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2244 (2003) (presenting a 
theoretical approach to defining and measuring the vague “adequacy” standard that near-
ly all state constitutions require of their schools); Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugar-
man, Educational Adequacy and the Courts:  The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Para-
digm, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 175, 188 (Helen F. Ladd et al. 
eds., 1999) (noting that “the adequacy approach is . . . unlike the traditional school 
finance cases . . . [as] adequacy cases aren’t about equality . . . [but] rather about spend-
ing what is needed”); Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the Courts, in 
ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL 218 (Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2002) 
(reviewing the history of cases addressing inequities in state education finance systems); 
Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy:  How Courts Are Redefining State Responsibility for 
Educational Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 281, 298 (describing 
how courts strive to obtain “adequacy” or adequate educational settings for students, not 
“equality of educational opportunity”). 
 2 See Tierney T. Fairchild, Commentary, Race and Class:  Separate and Not Equal, 26 EDUC. 
WEEK, no.3, Sept. 2006, at 35, 35–36, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
2006/09/13/03fairchild.h26.html (warning that classroom inequality will continue if ra-
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However, the allocation of educational resources to underprivileged 
students results in federal claims compartmentalized as race, gender, 
language, or wealth discrimination.3  As school officials attempt to 
fulfill federal and state legislative mandates, the Supreme Court’s ca-
tegorical treatment of protected classifications under its current 
equal protection doctrine has proved and will continue to prove a 
stumbling block. 
When applying its equal protection doctrine, the Supreme Court 
needs to reset its priorities.  Though the Court advocates equal edu-
cational opportunity, the government interests accepted to justify pol-
icies using protected classifications ignore the socio-political and go-
vernance changes experienced since Brown v. Board of Education in 
the public education context.  In light of these advances, this Article 
argues that an equal protection analysis of education reforms should 
defer to the expertise of local and state school officials.  To accom-
plish this deference, a state’s interpretation of its constitutional edu-
cation clause should be recognized as an important, and even com-
pelling, government interest, irrespective of the protected 
classification—race, gender, or socioeconomic status—when deter-
mining constitutionality under the federal equal protection doctrine. 
Communities rely on the classroom experience—shaped by 
school administrators, educational experts, and teachers—to positive-
ly affect their children’s life pursuits.  Racial minorities and poor fam-
ilies have employed grassroots movements, political lobbying, and the 
courts to ensure their children receive a quality education.  Recent 
reforms in New Mexico and Wake County, North Carolina, aptly illu-
strate the incongruence between federal equal protection doctrine 
and the goals of policymaking bodies. 
New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, on April 5, 2010, signed 
into law the Hispanic Education Act, the first education statute tar-
geted to close the achievement gap between Latino students and 
their white peers.4  Debates on the statute’s merits held in New Mex-
 
cial discrimination is conflated with concerns related to poverty and class); Debra Viade-
ro, Study Probes Factors Fueling Achievement Gaps, 23 EDUC. WEEK, no.13, Nov. 2003, at 1, 12, 
available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2003/11/26/13ets.h23.html (citing that 
black and Latino children are disadvantaged according to each of the fourteen research-
based learning indicators compiled by the Educational Testing Service). 
 3 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 1116–1117, 1119–1120 (2011) (reproducing the strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational or reasonable basis tests, and matters subject 
thereto). 
 4 “The purpose of the Hispanic Education Act is to . . . provide for the study, development 
and implementation of educational systems that affect the educational success of Hispan-
ic students to close the achievement gap and increase graduation rates.”  Hispanic Educa-
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ico’s Senate and House chambers roused visceral commentary.  A 
state senator who opposed the legislation argued that “[i]f a program 
or service, or if funding, is beneficial for a high risk student who is 
Latino it should be available to all students, regardless of race or cul-
ture.”5  Another legislator accused supporters of “developing a whole 
new generation of racism” by singling out Latino students.6  The 
chairwoman of the New Mexico’s Senate Education Committee re-
sponded that a “[o]ne-size-fits-all [strategy] is not getting the job 
done, and the achievement gap keeps growing.”7  Other legislators 
expressed a similar sentiment:  policies tailored to address the aca-
demic challenges uniquely experienced by Latino children were 
needed to resolve the achievement gap.8 
Garnering much more public fanfare, on March 23, 2010, the 
Wake County Board of Education, by a five-to-four vote, repealed its 
nationally acclaimed socioeconomic integration policy.9  Students will 
now be assigned to schools located nearest their homes.10  Opponents 
argued that neighborhood zoning would result in racial resegrega-
tion and student bodies with disproportionately high poverty rates.11  
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s 
(“NAACP”) state president blogged that “when children are packed 
into the most underfunded, most segregated, most high-poverty 
schools, it is nothing but a form of institutionalized child abuse.”12  A 
commentator posed the critical question:  “If we’re going to go back 
 
tion Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-23B-2 (2010); see also Heather Clark, Updated:  Debate Grows 
Over Proposed Hispanic Education Act, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.
abqjournal.com/news/state/aphispaniceducationact112-04-09.htm (highlighting the de-
bate over the need for and funding sources of the Hispanic Education Act, which aims at 
closing the achievement gap between Hispanic students and their white and Asian peers). 
 5 Marjorie Childress, Hispanic Education Act Targets Achievement Gap, N.M. INDEP., Feb. 4, 
2010, http://newmexicoindependent.com/46173/hispanic-education-act-targets- 
  achievement-gap (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6 Susan Montoya Bryan, House Passes NM Hispanic Education Act, KRQE NEWS 13 (Feb. 10, 
2010, 9:01 PM), http://www.krqe.com/dpp/news/politics/nm_legislature/house-passes-
nm-hispanic-education-act (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8 See Lawmakers Debate N.M. Hispanic Education Act, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 18, 2010, 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/02/18/332118nmxgrhispaniceducation_ap.ht
ml?r=1722260786 (quoting New Mexico Senate Majority Leader Michael Sanchez, who 
stated:  “People have to acknowledge that [the achievement gap] exists.  This is a start.”). 
 9 Stacy Teicher Khadaroo, Busing to End in Wake County, N.C. Goodbye, School Diversity?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/
2010/0324/Busing-to-end-in-Wake-County-N.C.-Goodbye-school-diversity. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to a system based on [students’] home address, how do we make sure 
that every single kid has access to a high-performing school?”13 
Prior to the vote, Wake County’s superintendent resigned, candle-
light vigils and rallies ensued, and officers arrested four protestors.14  
Once board members voted to strike the plan, the NAACP filed a 
formal complaint with the Department of Education’s Office of Civil 
Rights, prompting a federal investigation.15  The complaint alleged 
Title VI violations because school officials no longer factored diversity 
into student assignments and student reassignments.16  AdvancED, 
the accreditation body for Wake County high schools, will also con-
duct a special review of the board’s decision.17 
Imagining federal litigation, to consider the constitutionality of ei-
ther the New Mexico or Wake Forest reforms, strains one’s fidelity to 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine in light of quality 
education goals promulgated on the state and federal levels.  Under 
the federal equal protection doctrine, protected classifications ana-
lyzed under heightened scrutiny require state actors to provide an 
important or compelling government interest and an appropriately 
tailored means.18  Racial classifications demand the most rigid stan-
 
 13 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 14 Thomas Goldsmith & T. Keung Hui, School Board Sit-in Ends With Arrests, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Wake County), June 16, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/06/16/
535233/school-board-sit-in-ends-with.html; T. Keung Hui & Thomas Goldsmith, Citing 
Conscience, Wake Schools Chief Resigns, WAKE COUNTY NEWS & OBSERVER (Wake County), 
Feb. 17, 2010, www.newsobserver.com/2010/02/17/342924/citing-conscience-schools-
chief.html. 
 15 T. Keung Hui, Thomas Goldsmith & Mandy Locke, Wake School Board Under Probe, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Wake County), Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/11/18/
810056/wake-board-under-probe.html [hereinafter Wake School Board Under Probe] (“Wake 
County school leaders will have to defend their student assignment and discipline policies 
to federal civil rights investigators responding to complaints filed by the 
NAACP. . . . Word of the Wake review comes . . . [after school officials] discarded socioe-
conomic diversity as a factor in school assignment . . . .”); see also T. Keung Hui, Thomas 
Goldsmith & Mandy Locke, NAACP Takes Wake to Feds—Charges Aimed at School Board, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Wake County), Sept. 26, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/
09/26/703383/naacp-takes-wake-to-feds.html [hereinafter NAACP Takes Wake to Feds] 
(“[T]he state NAACP has launched a far-reaching legal effort to stop the transformation 
of North Carolina’s largest school district.”). 
 16 NAACP Takes Wake to Feds, supra note 15. 
 17 Wake School Board Under Probe, supra note 15 (“The state NAACP is also responsible for a 
special review being conducted by Advancing Excellence in Education Worldwide, or Ad-
vancED, the Georgia-based group that accredits Wake’s 24 high schools.”). 
 18 E.g., Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that state ac-
tions using racial and national origin classifications must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (holding 
that state actions using gender classifications must serve an important government inter-
est and be substantially related to stated objective). 
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dard of review, a compelling interest; gender classifications require 
an important interest; and wealth classifications require a legitimate 
interest.19 
In New Mexico and Wake County, North Carolina, the contested 
education policies invoked protected classifications known to affect 
academic achievement, and, in both jurisdictions, advocates on either 
side desire quality education for public school children.  Under the 
Court’s colorblind treatment of race and national origin classifica-
tions, applying strict scrutiny, New Mexico’s endeavor to commit 
more resources towards one ethnic group may prove unconstitution-
al.  However, the Hispanic Education Act contains provisions express-
ly advocated in the White House Initiative on Educational Excellence 
for Hispanics, an executive order renewed last year by President Ob-
ama after the Department of Education completed an eighteen-
month tour of Latino communities around the country.20  Moreover, 
the Hispanic Education Act’s purpose mirrors the statutory purpose 
of No Child Left Behind’s (“NCLB”) Title I programs, closing the 
achievement gap between at-risk students and their white peers.21  In 
Wake County, proponents for socioeconomic integration may find no 
relief through the federal courts because wealth discrimination rece-
ives a rational basis review.  However, on January 25, 2011, Arne Dun-
can, the United States Secretary of Education, spoke out against the 
district’s actions in a letter to the national press.22 
 
 19 E.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227 (“[Racial] classifications are constitutional only 
if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”); 
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197–98 (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”); San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (noting that for issues of 
wealth discrimination, the standard of review “is whether the challenged state action ra-
tionally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest”). 
 20 See Mary Ann Zehr, White House Renews Attention to Hispanic Education, 30 EDUC. WEEK, 
no.9, Oct. 2010, at 7, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/10/27/
09hispanic-2.h30.html (“The Obama administration has renewed its commitment to key 
priorities in the education of Hispanic students, including reduction of the dropout rate, 
improved connections between pre-K12 and postsecondary education, and passage of the  
‘DREAM Act,’ which would provide a path to legalization of some undocumented stu-
dents.”). 
 21 Compare No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006), with Hispanic Education Act, 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-23B-2 (2010) (noting the similarities in the purposes of the federal 
and state education statutes). 
 22 Duncan Chides Wake County for Dropping Diversity Plan, 30 EDUC. WEEK, no.18, Jan. 2011, at 
5, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/01/26/18brief-5.h30.html 
(“U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan has criticized a decision last year by North 
Carolina’s largest school district to end its program of busing students to achieve socioe-
conomic balance.”). 
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These scenarios accentuate the inability for federal equal protec-
tion doctrine to accommodate community interests, state and local 
deference, and nudging from the federal executive and legislative 
branches.  For example, the Supreme Court’s anticlassification stan-
dard may outweigh the federal legislative and executive standards 
leading New Mexico to create policies tailored to its constituency’s 
needs.  But how local and state officials translate federal educational 
priorities into policy should encounter minimal interference from 
federal courts.  The Court’s categorical treatment splits potential 
allies for quality education reform along race and socioeconomic 
lines and encourages advocates to forum shop, manipulating the 
equal protection doctrine’s focus on identity-based categories, as op-
posed to focusing on quality education goals. 
In addition, federal equal protection doctrine constrains school 
officials from developing innovative policies meant to compensate for 
the full range of a student’s impediments.  Racial and ethnic minority 
students, alongside a heterogeneous group of poor Americans, share 
a common goal:  quality education in public schools.  NCLB’s pur-
pose to close the achievement gap between students, and the educa-
tion adequacy doctrine refined through state finance litigation light a 
path to redress this common issue.  NCLB melds traditionally pro-
tected classes into a single group identified as disadvantaged or at-risk 
students.  Because NCLB measures a school’s success based on its 
ability to close the achievement gap, policymakers must account for 
myriad factors, including race, when crafting local and statewide edu-
cation reforms.23  Thus, in addition to satisfying the voting electorate 
by implementing policies befitting their unique demographic needs, 
state and local school officials must also possess a general under-
standing of how constitutionally protected traits intersect to affect a 
student’s academic performance. 
For decades, education scholars in law and the social sciences 
have observed the Supreme Court’s inability to situate education law 
challenges, involving protected classifications, within its equal protec-
tion framework.  In the interim, legal academics have diligently de-
veloped a body of scholarship for interpreting the equal protection 
clause that is germane to any context.  In particular, scholars diffe-
rentiate an antisubordination interpretation of the equal protection 
clause from the anticlassification application underlying the current 
Supreme Court’s colorblind ideology.  Antisubordination theory in-
 
 23 C. Joy Farmer, The No Child Left Behind Act:  Will It Produce a New Breed of School Financing 
Litigation?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 443 (2005). 
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terprets the equal protection clause to prohibit institutional practices 
and behaviors that reify the once-sanctioned, inferior status of minor-
ity groups.24  Professor Derrick Bell, in describing the remedial aspira-
tions underlying the Brown litigation, observed “the real evil of pre-
Brown public schools:  the state-supported subordination of blacks in 
every aspect of the educational process.”25  This subordination in-
cluded “unequal and inadequate school resources and exclud[ed] 
black parents from meaningful participation in school policymak-
ing . . . .”26  Alternatively, anticlassification theorists deem any diffe-
rential treatment based on a protected classification as presumptively 
unconstitutional, without regard to purpose or benefit.27 
Heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, antisu-
bordination ideals, and quality education pursuits under state consti-
tutional education clauses need not be addressed in a discrete man-
ner.  In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 
the Court declined to foreclose the possibility that other government 
interests may be suitable for justifying the use of protected classifica-
 
 24 See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve 
Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 
320 (2009) (“An antisubordination approach invalidates government action that reaf-
firms the disadvantage of historically oppressed groups.”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk:  
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004) (describing antisubordination theory as “the convic-
tion that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social sta-
tus of historically oppressed groups”); see also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 162–77 (1987) (presenting a dialogue regarding 
the history of the Equal Protection doctrine); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The Ameri-
can Civil Rights Tradition:  Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10–
11 (2003) (challenging “the common assumption that . . . the anticlassification principle 
triumphed over the antisubordination principle . . . [and] argu[ing] instead 
that . . . antisubordination values have shaped the historical development of anticlassifca-
tion understandings”); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 107, 157 (1976) (exemplifying the manner in which the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits state governments from “using race as the criterion of admission” for public ser-
vices). 
 25 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Dese-
gregation Litigation, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT 5, 10 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Bell, Jr., Serving Two 
Masters]. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Kenneth L. Marcus, Jurisprudence of the New Anti-Semitism, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 371, 408 
(2009).  See generally Balkin & Siegel, supra note 24, at 10 (discussing the view that the Su-
preme Court rejected the antisubordination principle in the 1970s in favor of the anti-
classification principle); Siegel, supra note 24, at 1472–75 (discussing the development of 
the anticlassification principle with respect to Brown). 
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tions.28  Since the Supreme Court has yet to enunciate an exhaustive 
list of government interests for the heightened scrutiny of protected 
classifications, I argue that quality education, as interpreted under 
the respective state constitutional education clauses, represents a via-
ble candidate.  Derek Black has also recently argued for incorporat-
ing state constitutional standards for public education into federal 
law through the Fourteenth Amendment and Title I.29  These litiga-
tion strategies for federal claims unify cross-jurisdictional disputes in-
itiated for the common cause of quality education in public schools. 
Under the federal equal protection doctrine, plaintiffs must em-
ploy a body of law developed to determine the constitutionality of 
policies invoking a discrete classification.  If the Court were to recog-
nize quality education, as defined by state constitutional education 
clauses, as a compelling government interest, the Court’s categorical 
treatment would need to give way to the possibility of heterogeneous 
classes of plaintiffs bringing an action against the state for not fulfil-
ling its obligation to adequately educate all children.30 
In Part I, I examine quality education as a feasible and well-
established (though not formally recognized) government interest 
under the federal equal protection doctrine.  The community de-
bates surrounding race integration, the civil rights movements for 
education reform instigated by other minority groups, and federal 
legislation justify recognizing quality education as a government inter-
est.  Furthermore, I argue that state constitutional education clauses, 
as interpreted by state supreme courts and legislatures, should guide 
federal courts in defining quality education.  Public education falls 
within the purview of states’ rights, and finance equity lawsuits prose-
cuted over the past thirty years gave most state governments occasion 
to define affirmative duties under their respective constitutions.31 
In Part II, I discuss the Supreme Court’s reluctance to acknowl-
edge quality education as a federal constitutional goal for education 
 
 28 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (“Without attempting 
in these cases to set forth all the interests a school district might assert, it suffices to note 
that our prior cases . . . have recognized two interests that qualify as compelling.”). 
 29 Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection:  The First Step 
Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1349, 1393 
(2010) [hereinafter Black, Unlocking the Power]; Derek Black, The Congressional Failure to 
Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
313, 363–66 (2010) [hereinafter Black, Congressional Failure]. 
 30 Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1376. 
 31 See generally Rebell, supra note 1, at 239 (discussing core concepts that state courts have 
incorporated into their state’s definition of “adequate”); Umpstead, supra note 1, at 282–
83 (stating that “adequacy” decisions with respect to education are made at the state level 
and discussing various definitions of “adequacy”). 
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policies invoking race, socioeconomic status, citizenship, and other 
classifications.  I provide an overview of the Court’s inability to give 
definitive counsel for how the importance of education, although not a 
federal right, should inform the constitutionality of education re-
forms involving protected classifications.  I assert that the importance 
of education arises as a recurring theme in the education context, re-
gardless of the protected classification.  The missing link, to provide 
consistency with federal and state mandates, would be to incorporate 
this principle as a government interest.  In establishing its meaning, 
we may draw upon the interpretation of NCLB through executive 
programs, legislation, and education clauses of state constitutions. 
In Part III, I argue that the Supreme Court’s colorblind ideology 
and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, as applied to education 
reform, does not align with the obligation for school districts to con-
sider social science data and protected classifications when develop-
ing programs.  This obligation inheres from the interpretation of 
state constitutional education clauses, state legislation, and federal 
legislative and executive mandates.  In this Part, I also highlight the 
pressure to implement policies specific to a state or district’s demo-
graphics in light of achievement gap concerns. I review how the in-
tersection of multiple traits affecting academic performance, such as 
race, gender, and socioeconomic status, are especially difficult to ac-
commodate given the Supreme Court’s categorical treatment of clas-
sifications. 
I.  PAST AND PRESENT, FEDERAL AND STATE:  RECOGNIZING QUALITY 
EDUCATION AS A GOVERNMENT INTEREST 
Under the equal protection clause, the underlying grievance ex-
pressed by plaintiffs in federal courts has always incorporated quality 
education as part and parcel of their equal educational opportunity 
argument.32  In the education context, according to a majority of the 
 
 32 See generally Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation:  A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 888–89 (1993) (arguing that low educational achievement among Afri-
can-Americans can be attributed to the structure of school financing); Martha Minow, Af-
ter Brown:  What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 608–09 
(2008) (stating that although early efforts in the Civil Rights movement focused on inte-
gration as a means for attaining equality of education, current scholarship suggests that 
integration does not necessarily equate to higher quality of education for black students); 
see also Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters, supra note 25, at 10 (“[C]ivil rights groups refuse to 
recognize what courts in [various cities] have now made obvious:  where racial balance is 
not feasible . . . there is adequate legal precedent for court-ordered remedies that em-
phasize educational improvement rather than racial balance. . . . They are intended to 
upgrade educational quality, and like racial balance, they may have that effect. . . .”). 
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Supreme Court, the two government interests suitable for race-based 
classifications are remedying intentional discriminatory acts and 
creating diverse classrooms.33  If we focus on the normative goals 
enunciated in Brown, these were not the only aims.  The black com-
munity wanted its children to receive a quality education.  The call 
for integrated schools provided a mere experimental solution to 
achieve quality education for an underserved group.34 
Post-Brown education reforms implemented by the federal execu-
tive and legislative branches and state governments demonstrate the 
proper emphasis on quality education as a government interest under 
equal protection doctrine.  Within a decade of Brown, the federal 
government entered the realm of public education governance.  
Congress passed legislation requiring schools to comply with Brown’s 
desegregation mandate.35  In addition, Congress accepted an ambi-
tious charge from President Lyndon B. Johnson to boost the academ-
ic achievement of all children adversely affected by impoverishment.36  
State supreme courts also entered the governance landscape, defin-
ing quality education with comprehensive interpretations of their re-
spective state constitutional education clauses.37 
If the Supreme Court accepted quality education as a government 
interest, federal courts would be guided by a wealth of defined stan-
dards from nearly every state when analyzing protected classifica-
tions.38  Moreover, the federal government’s involvement in public 
education governance would provide a unifying backdrop for these 
state-specific constitutional standards.  The following sections de-
scribe why quality education accurately describes the community and 
government interests contested through federal litigation efforts and 
 
 33 In Parents Involved, a majority of the Supreme Court, recognized two compelling govern-
mental interests:  (1) “remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination” and (2) 
“the interest in diversity.”  551 U.S. at 720–22. 
 34 See Carter, supra note 32, at 885 (stating that the promise of Brown has been eclipsed by 
the “intransigence of racism which has isolated poor African-American children in decay-
ing cities and in substandard schools”). 
 35 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-1 (2006). 
 36 See MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF, MOVING EVERY CHILD AHEAD:  FROM NCLB 
HYPE TO MEANINGFUL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 47–48 (2008) (providing a historical 
description of the passage of bills by Lyndon Johnson that provided more federal funding 
for education); see also PATRICK J. MCGUINN, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965–2005, at 28–33 (2006) (providing 
historical insight into the motives behind the creation of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act). 
 37 See supra note 1. 
 38 Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1349–50, 1399–1401. 
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gradually adopted through federal legislation and interpretations of 
state constitutional education clauses. 
A.  Revisiting the Roots of Brown from a Layman’s Perspective 
1. Quality Education and the Desegregation Debates 
The black community wrangled with the benefits of desegregation 
long before the Brown litigation.  The insufficient resources provided 
for black students in public schools, as justified through the separate 
but equal doctrine and pervasive prejudice, spurred a national de-
bate.  David Tyack observed that “[t]he demand for desegregation in 
northern cities was for most blacks a quest for equality and quality in 
schooling more than some vague aspiration for mixing of ethnic 
groups.”39 
The quality education theme, and whether integrated schools may 
result in quality education for black students, predates the equal pro-
tection clause.  In Roberts v. City of Boston, decided twenty years before 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, a family sued the Boston 
Public Schools system to end its segregation policy and admit their 
young daughter to an all-white elementary school.40  The court ruled 
against the black family, holding that “[i]t is urged, that this main-
tenance of separate schools tends to deepen and perpetuate the 
odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in 
public opinion.  This prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and 
probably cannot be changed by law.”41  Although the Roberts family 
embraced desegregation, its arguments before the court represented 
only one proposed solution to the dissatisfaction brewing in the 
community with regards to public education. 
The Roberts case incited a local controversy detailed by historians 
Stephen and Paul Kendrick in the documentary Sarah’s Long Walk.42  
This pre-Fourteenth Amendment desegregation battle resulted in a 
school boycott, violent community in-fighting, political activism, and 
 
 39 DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM:  A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 280 
(1974). 
 40 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 198–202 (1849); see TYACK, supra note 39, at 113 (discussing the 
sentiment of the black community in Boston with respect to integration of primary 
schools in the 1840s); see also SHEILA CURRAN BERNARD & SARAH MONDALE, SCHOOL:  THE 
STORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 44–46 (Sarah Mondale & Sarah B. Patton eds., 
2001) (providing a narrative on the historical context of Roberts). 
 41 Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 209. 
 42 STEPHEN KENDRICK & PAUL KENDRICK, SARAH’S LONG WALK:  THE FREE BLACKS OF BOSTON 
AND HOW THEIR STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY CHANGED AMERICA xi–xxiii (2004). 
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a protracted state litigation based on novel legal theories.43  The inte-
grationists, led by Benjamin Roberts, the young girl’s father, and her 
legal representatives, adopted an equal treatment perspective in-
spired by the desire to alleviate the stigma associated with enrollment 
in inferior, separate public schools.44 
In this historical narrative, the segregationist leaders, who were 
educated in integrated schools, argued that blacks should look inter-
nally to improve education.45  They argued that “black children 
needed to be in their own schools; where they could be ‘cheered on 
by the unanimous shout of encouragement of all [their] fellows with 
no jeers or unkindness to make heavy [their] heart.’”46  Both sides pe-
titioned the School Committee, and both sides debated their posi-
tions before the City Council.47  On September 17, 1849, the disa-
greement between the segregationists and integrationists erupted in 
violence when integrationists blocked the black students who wanted 
to attend the segregated black school from entering the building.48  
The attempt to compel participation in the school boycott ignited the 
only black-on-black violence attributable to the desegregation issue.49 
Nearly a century later, the NAACP’s litigation strategy for racial 
equality in the mid-twentieth century stirred a similarly heated debate 
among civil rights all-stars.  W.E.B. DuBois led the cavalry.  DuBois 
vocally opposed the NAACP’s “unmitigated” desegregation agenda.50  
In response to a reprimand from the NAACP for his public opposi-
tion to desegregation, DuBois resigned and reentered academia.51 
Back at Atlanta University, DuBois published Does the Negro Need 
Separate Schools?, in the Journal of Negro Education, to elaborate on his 
 
 43 Id. at 117–40. 
 44 Id. at 113–16. 
 45 Id. at 118–19. 
 46 Id. at 119 (alterations in original).  When Roberts made his intentions of integrating the 
public schools known, the community’s reception ranged from apathetic to antagonistic.  
Id. at 108.  Many community members predicted the poor treatment of their children by 
white peers.  Id.  These sentiments reflected a generational gap in attitude towards the 
need to integrate the city’s black and white populations.  Id. at 118.  Black elders general-
ly supported empowerment platforms, as opposed to integration.  Id.  The segregationists 
carried over the same mindset to school integration. 
 47 Id. at 125–26. 
 48 Id. at 132–34. 
 49 Id. at 135. 
 50 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 165 (1975).  As a founding member of the 
NAACP, respected activist, and leading scholar on black history, W.E.B. DuBois had con-
siderable influence.  His message eventually found its way into the NAACP’s magazine, 
The Crisis.  Id. at 166. 
 51 Id. 
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viewpoint.  His reasoning for supporting quality education, rather 
than integration, fell neatly in line with the arguments segregationists 
lodged a generation earlier.52  DuBois criticized the NAACP for pour-
ing money into its litigation strategy to desegregate public schools 
while bypassing a strategy to equalize resource allocations between 
black and white schools.53  He reasoned the “futile attempt to compel 
even by law a group to do what it is determined not to do, is a silly 
waste of money, time, and temper.”54  He ended this essay with an in-
famous line that still resonates today:  “[T]he Negro needs neither 
segregated schools nor mixed schools.  What he needs is Educa-
tion.”55  According to DuBois, this education required blacks to “be-
lieve in their own power and ability.”56 
But the desegregation movement pushed forward into the class-
room.  The transformation from a social movement to social reform 
litigation required civil rights attorneys and parents to make prognos-
tic decisions that, in hindsight, have affected the course of education 
reform in ironic ways.  In more recent years, with the benefit of hind-
sight, Professor Derrick Bell and Judge Robert L. Carter, both on the 
front lines at one point or another during Brown’s hopeful imple-
mentation, clarified the movement’s mission toward achieving quality 
education.  Judge Robert L. Carter, a member of Brown’s original liti-
gation team, reflected on the integration remedy in an essay, writing: 
[W]e saw the dual school system as the key barrier to equal educational 
opportunity for African-Americans.  With the 1954 declaration in Brown 
v. Board of Education, I believed the path was then clear for black children 
to receive an equal education.  My confidence in the inevitability of this 
result now seems naive.57 
Accordingly, the NAACP tabled equalization arguments because the 
attorneys believed that “integration was crucial to combating the 
generally accepted American mainstream notion that black people 
are educationally inferior to white people.”58  Based on the slow aca-
demic progress in predominately poor black communities following 
Brown, Judge Carter concluded that “[a]lthough integration is a very 
important goal[,] . . . [w]hat is desperately needed is [sic] decent 
 
 52 Id. at 165–66. 
 53 W.E.B. DUBOIS, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, in DUBOIS ON EDUCATION 139 (Eu-
gene F. Provenzo, Jr. ed., 2002). 
 54 Id. at 136. 
 55 Id. at 143. 
 56 Id. at 140. 
 57 Carter, supra note 32, at 885 (footnote omitted). 
 58 Id. at 889. 
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schools that will provide the means for a toehold on the ladder to 
mainstream employment.”59 
In Serving Two Masters, Derrick Bell analyzes the misinterpretation 
of Brown by federal courts and civil rights attorneys:  “[M]ost courts 
have come to construe Brown v. Board of Education as mandating 
‘equal educational opportunities’ through school desegregation 
plans aimed at achieving racial balance, whether or not those plans 
will improve the education received by the children affected.”60  He 
argues that “court orders mandating racial balance may 
be . . . educationally advantageous, irrelevant, or even disadvanta-
geous.”61  From his perspective, “civil rights lawyers continue to argue, 
without regard to the educational effect of such assignments, that 
black children are entitled to integrated schools.”62  In a subsequent 
article, channeling DuBois’s sentiments for a new era, Bell concludes 
that, “effective schools for blacks must be a primary goal rather than a 
secondary result of integration.”63 
Public interest litigation forces advocates to fit their grievances 
and solutions into legally cognizable claims for relief.  This process is 
similar to foreign language translation, where a second language’s 
limited vernacular may cause much to be lost with regards to express-
ing the problem and resolving an issue.  Anti-segregationist goals, 
couched in legally cognizable remedial terms, are not consistently 
deemed synonymous with quality education goals.  In the next sec-
tion, I briefly survey the Supreme Court’s vacillation in identifying an 
objective for equal educational opportunity through the desegrega-
tion cases. 
2. Lost in Translation:  Conquering Quality Education Through 
Judicial Interpretation and Legalese 
The battle to define desegregation’s goals as quality education or 
as equal educational opportunity took form over a series of Supreme 
Court cases.  For some Justices, the quality education goal remained 
exceedingly clear, while other Justices advocated for equal access to 
public schools.  One commentator observes that, “for social scientists 
desegregation was a process of social change and required integra-
tion, for lawyers desegregation was a remedy, its content shaped by 
 
 59 Id. at 896. 
 60 Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters, supra note 25, at 5 (footnote omitted). 
 61 Id. at 8. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 26. 
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the nature of the litigation process.”64  Furthermore, even though the 
social science and judicial definitions for desegregation coincided for 
over two decades, these differences help us understand the “reluc-
tance of current members of the Supreme Court to sanction race-
conscious remedies which are not directly linked to issues of constitu-
tional fault.”65 
The Supreme Court candidly admitted in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education that district courts “of necessity, em-
braced a process of ‘trial and error’ . . . .”66  Accordingly, it is impor-
tant to view the original arguments presented in Brown as a hypothe-
sized means to the desired end of quality education.67  In 1954, the 
Brown attorneys argued desegregation was the means to quality edu-
cation, and the Court acquiesced, because separate-but-equal had 
failed black children.  Brown sought to remedy the specific act of 
educating black children in segregated, inferior schools based on an 
unconstitutionally discriminatory social norm.68  In its holding, how-
ever, the Court expressed an equal protection goal that spanned 
beyond racial classifications.  The way subsequent Courts interpreted 
Brown’s goal directly affected the remedies available under the equal 
protection doctrine. 
Expanding the government interests recognized to justify using 
protected classifications would in turn broaden the scope of remedies 
found constitutional under the equal protection doctrine.  Through-
out the desegregation cases, Supreme Court opinions implicitly ac-
knowledged the goal of elevating educational quality provided to stu-
dents, but the Justices never formed a strong consensus.  In Green, the 
Court held that the duty to eliminate discrimination required judicial 
decrees that “so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of 
the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.”69  As Justice 
Douglas later envisioned, an integrated school system went beyond 
racially balanced schoolrooms to include “equality of facilities, in-
struction, and curriculum opportunities throughout the district.”70  
 
 64 Anne Richardson Oakes, From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication:  The Mean-
ing of Desegregation in Social Science Research and Law, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 61, 67 (2008). 
 65 Id. 
 66 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). 
 67 Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 
1561–62 (2004). 
 68 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954). 
 69 Green v. Cnty Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 n.4 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 226–27 (1973) (“An integrated school system does 
not mean . . . that every school must in fact be an integrated unit.  A school which happens 
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Justice Marshall recycled this argument in Milliken v. Bradley, stating 
that black students “must receive ‘what Brown II promised them:  a 
school system in which all vestiges of enforced racial segregation have 
been eliminated.’”71  Some district courts embraced this message.  In 
Freeman v. Pitts, the lower court considered the, “quality of education 
being offered to the white and black student populations” in addition 
to the Green factors.72  When the case reached the Supreme Court, it 
accepted educational quality as a “legitimate inquiry” that “unders-
cores the school district’s record of compliance.”73 
Other members of the Court have overlooked the quality issue 
embedded in the desegregation arguments.  A more narrow view of 
appropriate government interests confines policymakers to less effec-
tive means for resolving education deficiencies unique to at-risk stu-
dents in their district’s population.  In Freeman, Justice Scalia pro-
posed that “[t]he constitutional right is equal racial access to schools, 
not access to racially equal schools; whatever racial imbalances such a 
free-choice system might produce would be the product of private 
forces.”74  Three years later, in Missouri v. Jenkins, Justice Thomas ac-
curately observed that “[t]he mere fact that a school is black does not 
mean that it is the product of a constitutional violation.  A ‘racial im-
balance does not itself establish a violation of the Constitution.’”75  
However, the failure to provide a quality education to a protected 
class, as required by state constitutions, should be a federal constitu-
tional violation under the equal protection doctrine. 
In his dissent to the Court’s most recent pronouncement on racial 
assignments in public education, Parents Involved in Community Schools, 
 
to be all or predominantly white or all or predominantly black is not a ‘segregated’ school 
in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is a genuinely integrated one.”). 
 71 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 798 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Wright v. 
Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 463 (1972)); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 
237, 260–61 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining vestiges as “any condition that is 
likely to convey the message of inferiority implicit in a policy of segregation”). 
 72 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 473–74, 482–83 (1992) (arguing that “vestiges of the 
dual system remain in the areas of teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, 
and quality of education”); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968) (holding 
that schools should consider “problems related to administration, arising from the physi-
cal condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of 
school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determin-
ing admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and 
regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
 73 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492. 
 74 Id. at 503 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 75 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting United 
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992)). 
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Justice Stevens noted the majority’s cursory handling of Brown’s quali-
ty education requirements.  He admonished the Court’s emphasis on 
racial classifications and argued for a more historically accurate view 
of the situation:  the Brown plaintiffs sought an education for their 
children on par with that afforded white children—an equal educa-
tion opportunity argument encompassing quality education.76  Justice 
Stevens wrote: 
There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education . . . . The Chief Justice fails to note that it was 
only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history 
books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black 
schools.  In this and other ways, the Chief Justice rewrites the history of 
one of this Court’s most important decisions.77 
The Court inconsistently focused on quality education concerns un-
derlying equal protection challenges to desegregation policies.  Ad-
vocates for other protected groups, however, latched onto this argu-
ment in proposing changes to public education.  The following 
section exhibits how concerns held by English-language learner 
(“ELL”) advocates have progressed through an emphasis on quality 
education. 
B.  The Domino Effect:  How the Brown Decision Inspired Quality Education 
Goals for Other Marginalized Groups 
Brown inspired quality education movements on behalf of other 
identifiable groups including non-native English-speaking children, 
the poor, girls, and special education students.  Each group has 
gained great benefits from the Brown decision.  Scholars credit Brown 
for “precipitat[ing] a more assertive civil rights movement” and push-
ing forward the quality education agenda for other minority groups.78  
An education historian observed that before Brown, officials “often 
confused individual variation with gross social inequalities associated 
with poverty, oppression on the basis of color, or other features of the 
multiple subcultures of a highly plural society.”79  Since Brown, we 
now understand quality education concerns encompass other races 
 
 76 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 798–803 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that school districts’ use of racial classification in an ef-
fort to integrate “should be viewed differently” than the segregation presented in Brown). 
 77 Id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 78 ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:  CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 8 (2003) (arguing that Brown was a catalyst of a more aggressive civil rights 
movement in the 1950s and 1960s, and that the movement ultimately brought about far-
reaching change in American race relations). 
 79 TYACK, supra note 39, at 216. 
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and ethnicities, gender issues, varying learning abilities, and concen-
trated poverty in urban schools. 
At some point, parents in most racial and ethnic minority com-
munities protested the objectively inferior treatment of their children 
in the public education system.  In Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court 
decided a class action challenging the school district’s refusal to pro-
vide transition language classes to non-English-speaking Chinese stu-
dents under the equal protection clause and the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Although the Court did not reach the constitutional issue, the 
Court unanimously decided that the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition 
against national origin discrimination in education proscribed the 
district’s actions.80  The Court held that the “district must take affir-
mative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its in-
structional program to these students.”81  In this lawsuit, the class 
members did not request a specific remedy, only that school officials 
rectify the problem using their expertise to identify the appropriate 
means.82 
Although advocates for ELL students initially found themselves 
working within the civil rights framework of desegregation cases, they 
eventually parted ways in achieving the same goal for their respective 
constituency:  a quality education.83  Two decades after Lau, educa-
tional research on the best approach to ELL programs flooded aca-
demic circles.  Determining the most effective approach to educating 
English-language learners fractured supporters of transitional lan-
guage programs.84  Throughout the nation, districts implemented 
several variations to acclimating non-English-speaking students into 
the classroom.85  The two dominant approaches, English immersion 
and bilingual education, had pervaded the divisions between inter-
ested scholars.86 
 
 80 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974). 
 81 Id. at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82 Id. at 565. 
 83 Kristi L. Bowman, Pursuing Educational Opportunities for Latino/a Students, 88 N.C. L. REV. 
911, 924–26 (2010); Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty:  The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321, 1358 (2008) [hereinafter Moran, Re-
thinking Race]; Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion:  Federal Intervention in Bilingual 
Education, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1272, 1284 (1988) [hereinafter Moran, Politics of Discre-
tion]. 
 84 Moran, Politics of Discretion, supra note 83, at 1249–50 (chronicling the debates between 
social advocates, legislative bodies, and education regulators, for how to best incorporate 
ELL programs into public schools and enforce government policies). 
 85 Id. 
 86 English-Language Learners, EDUC. WEEK, Aug 4, 2004, http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/
english-language-learners/.  English immersion teaches the English language while si-
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ELL experts still debate which approach is “right” and all sides are 
wedded to identifying the best method for teaching English as a 
second language.  Studies conducted to determine the best approach 
produce inconclusive and contradictory results, similar to studies re-
garding the benefits of integrated classes and the need to pump more 
resources into inner-city schools.  Moreover, immigrant parents hold 
different opinions on whether their children should follow an Eng-
lish immersion or bilingual track in public schools.  Taxpayers have 
weighed in, offering their opinion through state referendum:  in Cal-
ifornia, Arizona, and Massachusetts, voters chose to curtail the atten-
tion and public funding allotted to English-language learning pro-
grams.87 
NCLB and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 regu-
late educational programs offered to English language learners.  Sec-
tion 1703(f) of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act requires 
school district to aid students in “overcom[ing] language barriers” 
through “appropriate action.”88  Courts review challenges pursuant to 
this section using three factors:   
1.  whether the school’s program is based upon sound educational theory 
or principles; 2.  whether the school’s program is reasonably calculated 
to implement the educational theory effectively; and 3.  whether, after a 
period of time sufficient to give the program a legitimate trial, the results 
of the program show that language barriers are actually being over-
come.89 
For English-language learners, the open mandate to provide a 
quality education, under state and federal legislation, leaves states to 
implement policies that fulfill this broadly understood equal protec-
tion goal.  At the end of the day, constitutional law has permitted 
educational experts to experiment with various methods for teaching 
students who may very well hold a national origin discrimination 
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s strict scrutiny analysis. 
 
multaneously teaching students academic lessons.  Id.  Bilingual education, whether tran-
sitional or two-way bilingual education, teaches English and academic lessons on separate 
tracks.  Id.  Students may encounter English and their native language in one classroom, 
or they may split their day between academic lessons taught in their native language and 
those focused on developing their English-language skills.  Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2006). 
 89 Types of Educational Opportunities Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/crt/about/edu/types.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
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C.  Contemporary Quality Education Goals:  Federal and State Stakeholders 
Acting on One Accord 
The standard that all children should be provided a quality educa-
tion, no matter the interpretation, remains intact from Brown.  The 
reality that desegregation is a fringe priority for many educa-
tion policymakers along with Title I’s focus on the quality problem 
evinces the Court’s diminished current role in defining government 
interests—a shift in the conversation led by political leaders requires 
a shift in the Court’s approach to the policies.90  The arguments sup-
porting the fundamentality of public education to our democratic so-
ciety, the structure of education governance, and the shared vision 
that all children must receive a quality education suggest revisiting 
the government interests that federal courts recognize under heigh-
tened scrutiny. 
1. Federal Stakeholders:  Quality Education Through the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 
Within the federal government, the priority given to race seems 
imbalanced when moving from the Supreme Court’s equal protec-
tion doctrine to the federal officials setting national education goals.  
Since the nation’s inception, its political leaders have maintained the 
importance of education.  Congress and the Department of Educa-
tion, through statutes and regulation, codified this commitment to 
quality education for all public school students.  It requires school 
districts to take into account a student’s race, gender, socioeconomic 
status, and learning abilities. 
Long before the Fourteenth Amendment and the goals of racial 
equality, political leaders championed the importance of minimal 
education for citizens.  Horace Mann famously proclaimed about 
education that “beyond all other devices of human origin, [it] is the 
equalizer of the conditions of men, the great balance wheel of the so-
cial machinery.”91  Thomas Jefferson and his peers proposed that our 
democracy rested on the ability of an educated citizenry able to “un-
derstand public issues, who would elect virtuous leaders, and who 
would sustain the delicate balance between liberty and order in the 
new political system.”92  According to Jefferson, these public respon-
 
 90 Bowman, supra note 83, at 950–51; Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in 
Parents Involved:  Why Fifty Years of Experience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735, 
738–39 (2008). 
 91 BERNARD & MONDALE, supra note 42, at 29. 
 92 Id. at 13. 
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sibilities required the ability to read and write.  Historian E.D. Hirsch 
supposes that Mann and Jefferson advocated in harmony for minimal 
education standards because “both of them disliked the idea of the 
family you were being born into determining how you ended up in 
American life.”93  The national rhetoric surrounding quality educa-
tion resulted in Congress imposing the obligation for states to estab-
lish free, non-sectarian public school systems as a condition of enter-
ing the Union.94 
Post-Brown federal legislation channeled the notion that educa-
tion should be considered a national priority inclusive of the poor 
and racial minorities.95  The Johnson administration’s political agen-
da, known as the War on Poverty, expanded the social justice charge 
to public school officials:  it addressed the educational deficiencies of 
all poor children, and it sought to improve public education for the 
purpose of ending poverty.96  In the early 1960s, Congress attacked 
the poverty and race issues in the public education system through 
two major pieces of legislation:  the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (“ESEA”).97  ESEA’s 
original purpose sought “to strengthen and improve educational 
quality and educational opportunities in the Nation’s elementary and 
secondary schools.”98  Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, public 
school programs discriminating on the basis of race, color, or nation-
al origin would jeopardize receiving federal funds, including Title I 
funding distributed through ESEA.99 
Through NCLB, ESEA’s latest reauthorization, Congress enacted 
goals and accountability standards that oblige participants to act in a 
certain manner across all spectra of public education.100  During his 
2000 campaign, President George W. Bush ran on the platform that 
education reform is a civil rights issue and a national priority.101  At 
the Republican Convention, he proclaimed that disparities in aca-
 
 93 Id. at 31. 
 94 Id. at 47. 
 95 MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 31; Black, Congressional Failure, supra note 29, at 314, 336. 
 96 MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 1; TYACK, supra note 39, at 270. 
 97 TYACK, supra note 39, at 270. 
 98 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 
(amended 2002); see also MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 33 (describing ESEA’s projected im-
pact on national education policy at the time it was passed). 
 99 Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d–2000d-1 (1965). 
100 Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice:  Safeguarding the Notion of Federalism 
in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 9 (2010) (“[T]he IASA required states re-
ceiving the ESEA Title I finds to adopt state standards and assessments aligned to meas-
ure progress toward those standards.”). 
101 MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 157. 
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demic performance were attributable to “the bigotry of low expecta-
tions.”102  NCLB Title I’s Statement of Purpose reads:  “to ensure that 
all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a 
high-quality education . . . .”103  Even though the methods imposed to 
bring about greater equality in educating impoverished children, 
pursuant to NCLB, have been criticized as ineffective, the core pur-
pose of Title I remains intact.104  Moreover, NCLB, President Bush’s 
banner legislation, provides support for an array of education re-
forms that involve race, gender and wealth classifications—one classi-
fication requiring no greater amount of scrutiny than the other. 
2. State Stakeholders:  Quality Education Through State Constitutional 
Education Clauses 
Local goals in educational achievement increasingly align with 
federal mandates to better educate disadvantaged children.  To reach 
complete equilibrium, it is necessary to build a homogenous body of 
law for education experts to follow when developing policy.  This sec-
tion focuses on the efforts by states, through judicial precedents and 
legislation, to establish a quality education standard.  It briefly re-
counts the history of education finance litigation and its semblance to 
the struggles for racial equality experienced in public schools 
through federal courts.  The Article then discusses the sophistication 
of education reform arguments in state courts that encompass an an-
tisubordination ideal, much different from the anticlassification 
standard our highest court supports. 
According to the Supreme Court, “[p]roviding public schools 
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.”105  Public education 
regulation falls within the Tenth Amendment powers reserved to the 
states.106  Nearly every state constitution includes a clause relating to 
the level of education to be provided to children enrolled in public 
schools.107  And to date, forty-five states have heard cases challenging 
the distribution of education funds.108 
 
102 Id. at 159. 
103 Title I of No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. §6301 (2006). 
104 Black, Congressional Failure, supra note 29, at 348–63. 
105 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). 
106 Charles J. Russo, Reflections on Education as a Fundamental Human Right, 20 EDUC. & L.J. 87, 
88 n.4 (2010). 
107 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2260 (“All state constitutions but one include a clause gu-
aranteeing an adequate education . . . .”).  For example, the New York state constitution 
requires the state legislature to “provide for the maintenance and support of a system of 
free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.”  N.Y. 
CONST. art. XI, § 1.  The Massachusetts state constitution states that: 
 
Feb. 2012] DEFINING QUALITY EDUCATION 685 
 
One scholar comments, “The focus on ‘adequacy’ may sound mi-
nimal, but the adequacy suits seek to raise standards, resources, and 
aspirations for all students and to do so in ways that reflect evolving 
demands on the economy and society.”109  Another observes, “[I]n 
their broadest sense, adequacy cases go beyond [the] basic finance 
purpose and reformulate a state’s responsibility for and treatment of 
its public educational establishment, encompassing the finances, 
goals, and accountability for the outcomes of education.”110  State 
constitutional education clauses are ambivalent to the protected clas-
sifications recognized under the federal equal protection doctrine; 
instead, they focus on what needs to be done to provide students with 
a certain level of education.111 
In this section, I ultimately conclude that just as the Department 
of Education entrusts states to develop educational improvement 
plans for compliance with NCLB, the federal courts should recognize 
state constitutional standards under heightened scrutiny. 
a.  From Equity to Adequacy:  The Quest for More than Equal 
Treatment’s Promise 
Scholars describe education finance reform as undergoing three 
“waves” of litigation in federal and state courts.112  Initially, education 
finance advocates embarked upon a litigation strategy based on the 
 
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of 
the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and 
as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education . . . it 
shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this com-
monwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all semina-
ries of them. 
   MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2. 
108 See Access Quality Education:  School Funding Litigation, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/litigation.php3 (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) 
(“Lawsuits challenging state methods of funding public schools have been brought in 45 
of the 50 states.”). 
109 Minow, supra note 32, at 634–35 (footnotes omitted). 
110 Umpstead, supra note 1, at 282–83. 
111 Id. at 286, 306, 313 (reviewing the interpretations of state supreme courts, and conclud-
ing that these constitutional provisions require public schools to perform three objectives 
aimed at “develop[ing] the intellectual, emotional, and moral capabilities of students as 
individuals, workers, and participants in our political system”). 
112 See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”:  From 
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1995) (“Commentators note three dis-
tinct ‘waves’ of school finance court decisions.”); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During 
the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation:  The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. 
REV. 597 (1994). 
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same principles guiding the race integration cases.113  Inspired by the 
state court decision, Serrano v. Priest, attorneys filed wealth discrimina-
tion claims in federal court arguing for equitable spending between 
property-rich and property-poor districts in their respective states.114  
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez, a group of parents filed a class action law-
suit against school officials challenging the state’s public education 
financing system.115  The proposed class sought remedies on behalf of 
“schoolchildren . . . who are members of minority groups or who are 
poor and reside in school districts having a low property tax base.”116  
With desegregation becoming more of a challenge for the federal 
judicial system, the Court decided to pass on the opportunity to re-
pair financial disparities in public education.117  Rodriguez foreclosed 
equal protection arguments under the federal Constitution, effective-
ly ending the first round of school finance cases. 
After the defeat in Rodriguez, arguments presented in state courts 
continued to echo the equity themes previously brought in federal 
court.118  The second wave of disputes began in New Jersey state court 
the same year as Rodriguez.  For example, Education finance litigation 
in New Jersey, which spanned three decades, originated with the Ro-
binson v. Cahill dispute.119  Advocates argued that state funding systems 
violated equal protection and failed to meet the state’s responsibility 
to adequately educate students.  In Robinson, the state supreme court 
found violations of the state’s constitutional education clause, requir-
ing a “thorough and efficient education” be provided to students in 
public schools.120  After years of state legislative resistance, the New 
 
113 See Rebell, supra note 1, at 221–25 (describing plaintiffs’ reliance on Brown’s promise of 
equal educational opportunity to argue for more equitable school funding). 
114 See generally Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971) (finding that the school 
financing system discriminates on the basis of the wealth); Minorini & Sugarman, supra 
note 1, at 183. 
115 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973). 
116 Id. at 5. 
117 The Court reasoned that “[s]ince the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a fami-
liarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitu-
tionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a 
hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.”  Id. at 41 
(quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)). 
118 Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 183 (explaining that many state court judges were 
no longer persuaded by wealth discrimination after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ro-
driguez). 
119 See Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) (reviewing a legal challenge to the New 
Jersey Public School Education Act of 1975). 
120 See id. at 132 (“The goal of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools shall be 
to provide to all children of New Jersey, regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic 
location, the educational opportunity which will prepare them to function politically, 
economically and socially in a democratic society.”). 
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Jersey court set forth explicit expectations for its public education sys-
tem.121  Close to one decade later, in the twentieth Abbott decision 
over a twenty-year period, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared 
the legislature’s educational funding plan constitutional under its 
education clause.122  Most recently, Governor Chris Christie at-
tempted to cut the school budget by over one million dollars.123  In 
response, the Abbott plaintiffs filed a motion to temporarily block the 
state’s actions and deny monetary shortfalls in the state budget as an 
excuse for not fulfilling education adequacy obligations.124  The court 
granted this motion. 
Outside New Jersey, equal protection arguments received a mixed 
welcome in state courts.  The objective comparisons between re-
sources provided to students attending wealthier and property-poor 
districts resonated in some states but produced no results in others.125 
Over time, finance equity advocates reoriented their rallying cry to 
request quality education for all public education students pursuant 
to state constitutional education clauses.  This transition resembled 
the broadened goals observed in the desegregation strategy—a quan-
titative comparison of inputs was not enough to achieve the move-
ment’s goals.126  Moreover, education finance advocates realized early 
on that education quality across any particular state wavered based on 
more than the racial composition in one’s school or district.  Even 
poor white children were not receiving the same quality education as 
their suburban white peers.127  As Derrick Bell argues in his theory of 
 
121 See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295–96 (N.J. 1973) (analyzing school reform pro-
posals and setting new requirements for standard public education). 
122 See Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 1009–10 (N.J. 2009) (finding that the school funding 
reform act conforms with the constitutional provisions for public education). 
123 See Access Quality Education:  New Jersey Litigation, NAT’L ACCESS NETWORK, 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/nj/lit_nj.php3 (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) (“[I]n 
the Spring of 2010, newly elected governor Chris Christie and the state legislature 
adopted an austerity budget that cut education funding by $1.08 billion, or 13.6%.”). 
124 See id. (“In June 2010, the Education Law Center, on behalf of the Abbott v. Burke litigants, 
filed a motion requesting the state’s high court to block implementation of the 2010–
2011 budget, because it failed to fund schools at the levels required by the 2008 School 
Funding Reform Act (SFRA).”). 
125 Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 190–91, 199 (explaining the different reactions to 
adequacy arguments in state courts). 
126 Id. at 177 (“[E]mphasis moved away from a comparison of conventionally measured edu-
cational resources to an emphasis on ‘intangibles.’”). 
127 Id. at 179 (arguing that differences in school quality may not have been a race question 
because schools in some suburbs seemed markedly superior to schools in other districts 
that largely enrolled white pupils). 
688 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
interest convergence, the interests of poor whites and blacks are ex-
ceedingly similar.128 
The third wave, known as the “adequacy movement,” began with a 
phenomenal state court precedent, Rose v. Council for Better Educa-
tion.129  This decision marked a transition from a fiscal equity strategy 
to “arguments focused on ensuring that all students have access to 
educational resources and opportunities adequate to achieve desired 
educational outcomes.”130  Commentators observe that this new focus 
was “one rooted not so much in comparing the poor education some 
children obtain with the superior education of other children, but ra-
ther in comparing the inadequate education many children receive 
as judged by some absolute standard.”131 
In Rose, the state supreme court served as a trailblazer for future 
adequacy cases by enumerating seven goals to be achieved through 
attaining a public education.132  Moreover, the state legislature fol-
lowed the court’s prescription for quality education through passage 
of legislation cued to the court’s formula for finance reform.133  In 
turn, these learning goals prodded an increase in the state’s educa-
tion budget.  A subsequent case, Young v. Williams, once again chal-
lenged Kentucky’s public school budget, arguing that schools could 
not achieve the constitutional education goals set forth in Rose under 
funding cuts.  The district judge invoked the separation of powers 
doctrine to dismiss the case.  In this instance, plaintiffs decided not to 
appeal the decision. 
Education finance litigation in New York also highlights the trans-
formation in strategy from equity and adequacy arguments.  In the 
first wave, plaintiffs filed Levittown v. Nyquist, challenging the funding 
disparities between the state’s property-rich and property-poor dis-
 
128 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, in 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 25, 
at 20, 24 (“Hence, over time, all will reap the benefits from a concerted effort toward 
achieving racial equality.”). 
129 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989) (holding that the 
Kentucky General Assembly had not provided for an efficient system of common schools 
throughout the state and that state funding of education was not adequate). 
130 Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 175–76 (citation omitted). 
131 Id. at 176. 
132 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215–16 (“Kentucky’s entire system of common schools is unconstitu-
tional.”); see id. at 208 (providing that education must be efficient, free, controlled and 
administered by the state, substantially uniform throughout the state, and equal to and 
for all students). 
133 Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 195 (mandating that an adequate education must 
provide students with seven capabilities). 
Feb. 2012] DEFINING QUALITY EDUCATION 689 
 
tricts.134  The court of appeals relied on reasoning found in San Anto-
nio v. Rodriguez, that the obligation to provide a public education did 
not translate into an obligation to provide an equal quality education 
to all children.135  In this holding, the court also pointed to the state’s 
obligation to support “a sound basic education” to public school stu-
dents.136 
In 1993, New York plaintiffs regrouped to file a second lawsuit, 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, against the state alleging failure to 
comply with the state constitutional education clause.137  Several years 
later, the plaintiffs prevailed.138  In conjunction with tasking the state 
to improve public education, the court ordered a costing-out study to 
help determine what needed to be done to satisfy the state constitu-
tion’s education clause.139  The state’s highest court upheld this rul-
ing, and charged the state legislature with calculating the funding 
needed to provide a “sound basic education,” allocating such funds, 
and implementing an accountability system.140 
When the state legislature delayed in compliance, the presiding 
judge appointed a special master to answer the outstanding cost an-
swers.141  From this point, the state judicial, legislative, and executive 
branches were able to find common ground in providing additional 
funding and implementing an accountability system to ensure dis-
tricts met the constitutional education mandate.142 
 
134 Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 361–62 (N.Y. 1982) (challenging the state funding 
scheme as a violation of the equal protection clause and the state constitution Education 
Article because it results in “grossly disparate” educational opportunities in different dis-
tricts in the state). 
135 Id. at 364 (pointing out that the Supreme Court in Rodriguez had already rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument, that the disparity in per-pupil expenditure violated the Fourteenth 
amendment). 
136 Id. at 369. 
137 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, No. 111070/93, 1999 WL 34782728, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 1999) (reviewing plaintiffs’ claim that the state’s school funding me-
chanisms caused the education afforded to students to fall below the requirements of the 
state constitution and discriminate against the city’s minority public school students). 
138 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. 2006) (“Mindful of the fun-
damental value of education in our democratic society, we agreed with plaintiffs’ inter-
pretation of the Education Article.”). 
139 See generally Access Quality Education:  New York, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, 
http://www. schoolfunding.info/states/ny/lit_ny.php3 (last visited on Nov. 2, 2011) (de-
scribing the orders given by the judge in Campaign for Fiscal Equality). 
140 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 861 N.E.2d at 59–61. 
141 See supra note 139. 
142 See id. (describing the legislature’s acceptance of Governor Elliot Spitzer’s 2007 funding 
increase). 
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b.  Defining Quality Education as a Government Interest 
Through State Constitutional Education Clauses 
Since public education is undoubtedly regarded as a local matter 
under state control, federal courts should incorporate the definition 
of quality education, defined by the respective states as a government 
interest justifying the use of protected classifications.  As opposed to 
the anticlassification doctrines applied by the Supreme Court, the 
state constitutional interpretations act more along the lines of the an-
tisubordination definitions argued for in interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause.  Whereas Brown “combined 
education with discrimination on the basis of race,” the course of 
education adequacy reform through state courts addressed race as a 
component to fulfilling the state’s constitutional obligation.143  The 
goal for “high-minimum quality education for all” does “not rest on a 
norm of equal treatment.”144  And while some state courts have re-
fused the job of defining this minimal education standard, one may 
find a definition through either state supreme court rulings or state 
legislative mandates. 
Even though the phraseology used in state constitutional educa-
tion clauses reads slightly differently, “[a]lmost every state constitu-
tion requires its government to institute and sustain a system of pub-
lic schools.”145  For the instances where state courts choose not to 
become involved in the debate over quality education, they rely on 
separation of powers principles; thus, state legislatures must define 
educational standards and the amount of funding needed to attain 
these goals.146  Adequacy claims impose an affirmative duty on state 
legislatures to create public education systems that offer minimal 
provisions to every child enrolled in public schools.147 
Since Brown, education governance has experienced phenomenal 
changes.  Whereas local districts once held great autonomy, educa-
tion reforms continue to layer oversight and implementation func-
tions between federal and state government actors.  Everyone in-
volved, except the Supreme Court, recognizes the need to take 
 
143 Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 181. 
144 Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145 Umpstead, supra note 1, at 288–89; see also Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 
1343, 1366–71. 
146 Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 199. 
147 Kagan, supra note 1, at 2258 (“These clauses create positive states duties (such as the leg-
islature’s obligation to provide an adequate education) . . . .”); Pinder, supra note 100, at 
8 (discussing how “adequacy returns the determination of how to improve schools to the 
state legislature”); Umpstead, supra note 1, at 286. 
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comprehensive stock of the systemic challenges facing public educa-
tion.  State constitutional provisions align more with the direction of 
contemporary education reform than the Supreme Court’s categori-
cal treatment of protected classifications used to determine the con-
stitutionality of education reforms. 
Through state courts, constitutional education clauses have been 
interpreted to adopt an antisubordination quality standard as op-
posed to an anticlassification colorblind ideology.  The academic 
outcomes resulting from finance litigation are not yet clear; however, 
these cases do permit a space for legislatures and advocates to 
recreate state educational systems.148  For example, in Kentucky, the 
financial inputs on the budgetary side were easily measured, but the 
governance and accountability were not aptly implemented.149  After 
the Abbott litigation in New Jersey, school districts directly affected by 
the court’s pronouncement experienced minimal gains in test scores; 
however, New Jersey still fairs poorly as compared to other states 
working to close the achievement gap.150 
More politically motivated opposition also plagues the implemen-
tation of judicial standards imposed under state constitutional educa-
tion clauses.  In Ohio, even though the state supreme court has re-
peatedly found its public education system unconstitutional, the 
legislature refuses to act upon the pronouncements.151  The most in-
famous state finance litigation, in New York, appeared successful, but 
extended debates between state and local officials regarding who 
should fund the reforms have delayed program implementation.152  
The aftermath of these cases demonstrates that a quality education 
focus under the law completes only one part to the reform puzzle.  In 
Part III, I elaborate further on this idea in a discussion of race-
conscious state decisions referred to as the fourth wave of finance lit-
igation.153 
 
148 Frederick M. Hess, Adequacy Judgments and School Reform, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS:  THE 
LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 159, 161, 168 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Pe-
terson eds., 2007). 
149 Id. at 159, 167. 
150 Id. at 159, 172. 
151 Id. at 159, 178. 
152 Joe Williams, The Non-Implementation of New York’s Adequacy Judgment, in SCHOOL MONEY 
TRIALS:  THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note 148, at 159, 211. 
153 Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1343, 1361–75; Kristi L. Bowman, A New Strate-
gy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality in Public Schools, 1 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 47, 
57 (2009); Kevin Randall McMillan, The Turning Tide:  The Emerging Fourth Wave of School 
Finance Reform Litigation and the Court’s Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1867, 1896–1902 (1998); Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation:  Acknowledg-
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II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S RELUCTANCE TO RECOGNIZE QUALITY 
EDUCATION AS A GOVERNMENT INTEREST 
Brown and its progeny were understood to address race integra-
tion, obscuring underlying demands for educational quality.154  The 
Warren Court mandated the experimental remedy of desegregated 
schools.  Although this judicial remedy could not cure the social 
norms that led to a dual public education system, the proposed re-
medy sought to resolve its harmful effects.  Brown forced federal and 
state governments to rethink what provisions were needed to achieve 
the normative goal of quality education for all children.  Although 
accurately described as a desegregation case, Brown I was more a con-
stitutional challenge seeking quality education for black students.  
Over the past fifty years, as demonstrated above, federal and state 
government actors have adopted a quality education standard.  Yet 
the Supreme Court remains stagnant by insisting that the invoked 
protected classification should gauge any degree of deference per-
mitted to education policymakers. 
The Brown decision hallmarked two triumphs, independent of 
race, in the constitutional analysis of education policies:  the Brown 
attorneys successfully introduced social science evidence to help show 
why the Court should prohibit state-mandated segregation,155 and the 
opinion spoke to the importance of education and the need for all 
American children to receive a quality education on par with one 
another.156  In Brown I, the Court took a comprehensive look at the 
“effect” of “segregation itself on public education.”157  Although not 
explicitly arguing education as a fundamental right, the Court ex-
alted the status of public education.  Justice Warren wrote: 
 
ing That Race Discrimination in Public Education Is More Than Just a Tort, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
99, 165–68 (2001). 
154 Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown® Do For You?:  Neutral Principles and the Struggle Over the 
Equal Protection Clause, Lecture (Mar. 25, 2008), in 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1063 (2009) (ex-
plaining that Parents Involved cites Brown for the proposition that race segregation, rather 
than unequal educational opportunities, provides the basis for finding a constitutional 
violation). 
155 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.11 (1954) (listing social science stu-
dies); Rachel F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge?  A Reflection on Race, Social Science, and 
the Law, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515, 517–18 (2010) [hereinafter Moran, What Counts as 
Knowledge] (describing the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s use of social science evidence). 
156 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493. 
157 Id. at 492–93 (“We must consider public education in light of its full development and its 
present place in American life throughout the Nation.  Only in this way can it be deter-
mined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of 
the laws.”). 
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[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities . . . . It is the very foundation of good citizen-
ship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion.158 
Despite the generalized language espoused in Brown I, race still en-
joys an enduring omnipresence in equal protection doctrine.  Al-
though we began the pursuit of quality education with an exclusive 
focus on race, we now need to expand our horizons to meet the de-
mographic challenges facing public education in today’s society. 
The Court’s analysis involving classifications other than race ac-
knowledged the importance of education but rejected quality educa-
tion as a right guaranteed under the federal Constitution.  The 
Court’s holdings in San Antonio v. Rodriguez and Plyler v. Doe, both 
non-race cases decided under rational basis review, showcase these 
thoughts.  The holdings in Rodriguez and Plyler represent the doctrinal 
foothold for recognizing quality education as a government interest.  
First, even though the opinions analyzed two distinct classifications 
under rational basis review, the Court reached different conclusions 
with regards to the rationality of state action.159  Both classifications 
required deference to the state legislature, but the Court still en-
gaged in a robust debate leading to opposite holdings.160  If the Court 
incorporated quality education goals into equal protection doctrine 
through deference to state officials, this would in no way compromise 
the Court’s ability to identify policies in violation of equal protection 
doctrine.  This recognition would, however, provide an additional ba-
sis for education policymakers to realize the core goals of the civil 
rights agenda. 
Second, the importance of education played a role in the majority 
and dissenting opinions for each case.161  Although education’s role 
in democratic society may not prove dispositive when determining 
the deference to be accorded education experts, its role no doubt 
exerts influence.  The established importance of education, com-
bined with the state’s reserved right to control public education mat-
ters, support the leap for federal equal protection doctrine to incor-
 
158 Id. at 493. 
159 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 29, 58–59 (1973). 
160 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216–18; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.  Each opinion drew four dissenting 
votes. 
161 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222; id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 248 (Burger, J., dissent-
ing); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33, 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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porate quality education (as defined under state constitutional edu-
cation clauses) as a viable government interest. 
In Rodriguez, the Court held that there was no “right to education 
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”162  The major-
ity reasoned “the undisputed importance of education will not alone 
cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a 
State’s social and economic legislation.”163 
In his dissent to Rodriguez, Justice Marshall argues that protecting 
against “[d]iscrimination in the opportunity to learn that is afforded 
a child must be our standard.”164  He held education essential for civic 
participation in the political process and in the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.165  NCLB’s standards are congruent with Justice 
Marshall’s thoughts on the appropriate level of equity in public edu-
cation.  He states: 
[B]ecause some ‘adequate’ level of benefits is provided to all, [it does not 
mean that] discrimination in the provision of services is therefore consti-
tutionally excusable.  The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to the 
minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action.  
It mandates nothing less than that all persons similarly circumstanced shall 
be treated alike.166 
“Similarly circumstanced” need not be defined by a single trait; as de-
fined under NCLB, “similarly circumstanced” encompasses all disad-
vantaged children and their ability to perform at proficiency levels 
comparable to their peers.  In this case, Justice Marshall reasserts his 
argument for a “spectrum [of standards]” based on “the constitution-
al and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the 
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular clas-
sification is drawn.”167 
In Plyler v. Doe, the Court deliberated whether “Texas may deny to 
undocumented school-age children the free public education that it 
provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally 
admitted aliens.”168  Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated that 
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less 
than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legisla-
 
162 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33–35 (majority opinion). 
163 Id. at 35. 
164 Id. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
165 Id. at 112–13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
167 Id. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
168 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205, 215–16 (1982) (examining laws passed by the Texas legis-
lature withdrawing funds to support public education for students not legally residing in 
the country and authorizing a district to deny enrollment on the same basis). 
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tion.”169  The law’s effect on children receiving a public education 
proved influential to the Court’s analysis.170  The Court reasoned that 
education stood apart from other governmental benefits due to its 
role “in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of 
its deprivation on the life of the child.”171  Public education helps the 
individual, which in turn helps society.  Thus, society benefits from 
the education of individuals participating in the economy and politi-
cal process.172 
ESEA solidified the government’s interest in providing quality 
education to disadvantaged children, which encompasses more than 
the color line of black and white.173  Most state supreme courts have 
adopted this goal through interpretation of their respective constitu-
tional education clauses.174  And most recently, NCLB focuses on pro-
tected groups that have gained attention through the civil rights 
movement sparked by Brown.  The next Part discusses how social 
science data advises education reforms supported by the federal ex-
ecutive and legislative branches and some state supreme courts.  In 
light of the mutuality between law and social science research, the 
Supreme Court must find some space in its equal protection legal 
doctrines to incorporate research-based methods in the evaluation of 
education policies. 
III.  TOEING THE LINE:  PROTECTED CLASSIFICATIONS, EDUCATION 
POLICY, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA 
In addition to not recognizing a fundamental right to education, 
the Court also uses its activist ideology to undermine educational 
quality reform attempted by policy makers.  In reviewing the Court’s 
education doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Justices 
seem to draw their guiding equality standard, colorblindness, from 
 
169 Id. at 213. 
170 Id. at 220–21 (arguing that children have no control over their parents’ conduct and that 
public education is a special governmental benefit). 
171 Id. at 221.  Justice Blackmun’s concurrence echoed this sentiment, stating that “Rodriguez 
implicitly acknowledged that certain interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, 
must be accorded a special place in equal protection analysis.”  Id. at 233 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
172 Id. at 221 (“In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our 
society.  We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select 
groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order 
rests.”). 
173 FREDERICK M. HESS & MICHAEL J. PETRILLI, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 132 (2006). 
174 Kagan, supra note 1, at 2241–42; Rebell, supra note 1, at 218; Umpstead, supra note 1, at 
282. 
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the aspirational goal of resolving the original discriminatory act of 
segregation.175  The Justices conduct this analysis based on an assump-
tion that current social norms alleviate discriminatory realities, that 
we have no greater understanding of the factors leading to underper-
formance in public schools, and that Congress has not implemented 
a complete overhaul of education policy.  As courts move from a pro-
scriptive to permissive role in education policy, it will require the re-
consideration of federal and state roles in improving education quali-
ty and social science research regarding the accessibility of 
educational opportunities based on a student’s diverse demographic 
background. 
Congress and states rely on social science data to inform educa-
tion reforms implemented to close the achievement gap and improve 
underperforming academic programs.  This reliance leads policy-
makers to conclude that race and other protected traits should be 
considered for curricula and programs developed to remove the defi-
ciencies plaguing minority and impoverished communities.176  The 
Court’s individualistic anticlassification treatment of protected 
groups inhibits school officials from enacting these informed, al-
though experimental, policies.  This Part discusses the push from 
Congress, the Department of Education, and state courts for school 
officials to incorporate social science data into their reform of educa-
tion policies.  Based on this encouragement, I argue that race and 
other considerations, categorized as societal discrimination, are in-
evitably considered when crafting education policies for many geo-
graphical areas.  Therefore, the Court’s equal protection doctrine 
falls short in providing the deference needed for education policy-
makers to fulfill their federal and state mandates of developing poli-
cies reflective of social science research while simultaneously satisfy-
ing the Court’s equal protection standard. 
A.  The Entangled Web:  Congress and States Encourage Reliance on Social 
Science Evidence to Inform Education Policy 
Race, gender, geography, and socioeconomic status serve as prox-
ies for identifying children with such underserved educational needs.  
The Court’s categorical treatment of protected classifications hinders 
the ability of school officials to create policies tailored to their stu-
dent population—an approach advocated by the federal government 
and state constitutional education clauses.  Brown I’s shock value 
 
175 Karlan, supra note 154, at 1064; Robinson, supra note 24, at 313–25. 
176 Fairchild, supra note 2. 
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stems in part from the Court’s activist stance against race discrimina-
tion in public education.177  Then, the Supreme Court stood at the fo-
refront of the executive branch and Congress to end segregation in 
public schools.178  The Court filled a void during the 1950s; however, 
it never loosened the reins to permit experimentation with education 
reforms as contemplated in NCLB and state-level directives to local 
districts. 
Congress and local school officials are expected to overcome dis-
connects between policy goals and reality.  The explanation for dis-
parate academic performance has shifted from overt prejudice to the 
residual, cumulative effects of overt and systemic prejudice.  No long-
er are black children mandated by the state to attend poorly funded 
and neglected schools, immigrant children denied language transi-
tion classes, or girls limited to a “life skills” curriculum track.  A more 
difficult issue lays on the horizon—systemic disparities, carrying no 
less a detrimental effect on a student’s academic performance.179 
Jeannie Oakes, along with her co-authors, criticized the “inequali-
ty frame” presented in Rodriguez for transforming potential allies into 
competitors by “[a]ppealing to those who have the least, along with 
their allies driven by justice concerns.”180  They explain that this advo-
cacy model ignores the advantages gained by all through redistribut-
ing education resources.181  Oakes lauds the “quality diagnostic frame” 
for not suggesting the diminution of funds to certain schools, espe-
cially middle-class communities that may feel threatened.182  But she 
concludes that inequality and adequacy arguments may “offend those 
who are relatively better served by schools.”183  Instead, she argues for 
an expanded social justice framework that views “education as de-
pendent upon, rather than competitive with, resources essential to 
 
177 COTTROL ET AL., supra note 78, at 8. 
178 Id. at 217. 
179 REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 36, at 72–73; Jeannie Oakes et al., Grassroots Organizing, Social 
Movements, and the Right to High-Quality Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 339, 365–66 
(2008). 
180 Oakes et al., supra note 179, at 365–66.  The authors describe the inequality frame as 
“shaped in the more general struggles for civil rights and social equality, diagnoses the 
problem as one of unequal access to educational opportunity, and calls for redistribution 
and leveling.”  Id. 
181 Id. (“The inequality frame is self-limiting in its reach. . . . [It] fails to challenge the logic of 
scarcity, [and] it seems to call for redistribution within a ‘zero-sum’ arena of high-quality 
education.”). 
182 Id.  The Authors describe the quality diagnostic frame as “seek[ing] to increase material 
resources for all, even as it redistributes the more abstract quality of relative ‘advantage.’”  
Id. 
183 Id. at 366. 
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the health and well being of communities and families, and integrally 
connected to health care, housing, income security, public safety, en-
vironmental protection, and so on.”184 
Similarly, Michael Rebell of Teachers’ College, in Moving Every 
Child Ahead, argues that “to provide a meaningful educational oppor-
tunity to at-risk children from communities of concentrated poverty, 
students must be provided, as needed, with specific out-of-school 
educational essentials.”185  This external support, funded through 
public school budgets, includes early education, academic support, 
and exposure to extracurricular activities.186  With the shifting demo-
graphic and push to develop innovative learning programs that close 
the achievement gap, it is appropriate for the Court to develop an 
analysis in line with what is being asked of school districts. 
1. No Child Left Behind’s Goal to Close the Achievement Gap 
NCLB ushered in a new era of federal involvement in K–12 public 
education.  Under the Johnson administration, education experts 
measured success based on the “pace of state integration efforts and 
the size and distribution of school resources.”187  The 1960s reform 
treated integration and monetary distribution as individual pieces of 
the puzzle to achieve quality education and economic parity.  Howev-
er, under NCLB, the annual yearly progress requirements merged 
these two quests under one mission.  NCLB implemented require-
ments that encourage experimentation without wiping out desegre-
gation as an educational priority, because the Civil Rights Act re-
mained on the books. 
NCLB’s overarching goal is closing the achievement gap between 
at-risk students and their peers.188  Three explanations have been giv-
en to explain the achievement gap:  first, “a lack of resources, particu-
larly money and know-how, in needy schools;” second, “problems in 
society and the larger culture, especially the effects of poverty;” and, 
third, “a dysfunctional school culture and a lax system of governance 
and incentives that permits school systems to avoid making unpopu-
lar decisions, even when those are essential to improving perfor-
 
184 Id. at 367. 
185 REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 36, at 72–73. 
186 Id. at 72–73 (listing necessary out-of-school systems for at-risk students). 
187 MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 33. 
188 HESS & PETRILLI, supra note 173, at 21 (“NCLB advocates . . . . were concerned about the 
nation’s ‘achievement gap’—primarily the disparity between the performance of white 
and Asian students, on the one hand, and African-American and Latino students, on the 
other.”). 
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mance.”189  NCLB adopts the viewpoint that failures on the school and 
district levels explain poor student performance and strong accoun-
tability measures will incentivize schools to improve achievement le-
vels.190  Every state agreed to fulfill the accountability measures im-
posed under the statute’s scheme for improvement in academic 
performance.191  Although many states have criticized NCLB’s man-
dates and schedule for improvement, it is still the nation’s premier 
education policy. 
2. The Federal Tug-of-War over the Role of “Scientifically-based 
Research”—Courts v. the Executive and Legislative Branches 
The social science literature available to Congress while deliberat-
ing ESEA focused heavily on how a student’s socioeconomic status 
might affect academic performance.192  Similar to contemporary de-
bate, scholars contested the most effective methods for educating 
disadvantaged children, the effects of race and socioeconomic diver-
sity on a student’s academic performance, and the way government 
could best support improvements in public education.193  As circums-
tances change, social science research tracks developments to better 
understand academic performance, and NCLB encourages school of-
ficials to participate in these investigations.194  State courts also have 
relied on research-based methods to craft remedies for adequacy law-
 
189 Id. at 22. 
190 Id. at 23 (“[NCLB] is premised on the notion that local education politics are fundamen-
tally broken, and that only strong, external pressure on school systems, focused on stu-
dent achievement, will produce a political dynamic that leads to school improvement.”). 
191 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND:  A ROAD MAP FOR STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2005), available at http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/
roadmap/roadmap.pdf (“Within 18 months of [NCLB’s] passage, all 50 states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Puerto Rico had submitted detailed plans for meeting NCLB’s stu-
dent achievement goals.”). 
192 MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 31–32 (“ESEA was premised on the idea that the federal gov-
ernment should intervene in what was increasingly seen as an education crisis among 
poor and minority children.”). 
193 Id. at 31–33; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 36, at 47–48. 
194 Jonathan Margolin & Beth Buchler, Critical Issue:  Using Scientifically Based Research to Guide 
Educational Decisions, N. CENT. REG’L EDUC. LAB., LEARNING POINT ASSOCS., 
http://merainc.org/archives/past_conferences/fall2010/pdfs/GullenHandout1.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2011) (“The imperative for incorporating SBR is dictated not only by fed-
eral law, but by common sense as well. . . . [E]ducators will need to care about SBR and 
how it impacts success in their school.  They will need to learn and understand SBR in 
order to improve learning in the classroom and integrate SBR into their educational 
modus operandi.”). 
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suits.195  The Supreme Court, by providing greater deference to state 
and local school districts, could find a way to accommodate social 
science research without allowing trends to dictate a constitutional 
decision’s outcome. 
a.  The Federal Courts and Social Science Evidence 
In Brown I, the NAACP’s briefs explicitly relied on social science 
evidence to support its arguments against segregated schools.196  The 
Court referenced social science evidence reaching the same conclu-
sions in a footnote of the Brown I opinion.197  This reference to socio-
logical studies continues to raise contentions about the validity of the 
research and the weight to be given social science when determining 
constitutional issues.198 
Justice Frankfurter believed that “courts had to frankly concern 
themselves with considerations of good policy, considerations that 
should rest on the best available scientific learning.”199  Not every Jus-
tice shares this opinion.  In Missouri v. Jenkins, Justice Thomas em-
phatically stated that social science research “cannot form the basis 
upon which [the Court] decide[s] matters of constitutional prin-
ciple.”200  He went on to declare that “[t]he judiciary is fully compe-
tent to make independent determinations concerning the existence 
of state action without the unnecessary and misleading assistance of 
the social sciences.”201  He insisted that lower courts resist being influ-
enced by “the easy answers of social science” and encouraged them to 
 
195 Access Quality Education:  A Costing-Out Primer, NAT’L ACCESS NETWORK (June 1, 2006), 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/costingoutprimer.php3 (noting that 
“[a] variety of approaches for undertaking such [adequacy] studies have been used in re-
cent years in many states . . . in some cases as part of the development of a new funding 
system ordered by a state court”). 
196 Moran, What Counts as Knowledge, supra note 155, at 517–18 (detailing the manner in 
which the NAACP approached the Brown I brief and incorporated social science evidence 
into its argument); see also KLUGER, supra note 50, at 315–21 (recounting the develop-
ment of social science evidence and the NAACP’s use of it). 
197 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (listing psychological studies). 
198 Moran, What Counts as Knowledge, supra note 155, at 518 (noting that following Brown I 
“some believed that the case would usher in a new partnership between law and social 
science”); Michael Heise, Judicial Decision-Making, Social Science Evidence, and Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity:  Uneasy Relations and Uncertain Futures, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863 (2008) 
(analyzing the contentious use of social science evidence in constitutional cases). 
199 COTTROL ET AL., supra note 78, at 81. 
200 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
201 Id. at 121. 
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reject “the findings, and the assumptions, of sociology and psycholo-
gy at the price of constitutional principle.”202 
Justice Marshall addressed similar arguments in Rodriguez.  He did 
not argue directly on behalf of using social science.  However, he 
admonished the Court’s majority for extrapolating positive assertions 
from inconclusive evidence.  In Rodriguez, he contends that:  “If, as 
the majority stresses, such authorities are uncertain as to the impact 
of various levels of funding on educational quality, I fail to see where 
it finds the expertise to divine that the particular levels of fund-
ing . . . assure an adequate educational opportunity . . . .”203 
In Parents Involved, the Court found two voluntary desegregation 
plans unconstitutional.204  In this case, the Court consolidated chal-
lenges brought against the Seattle School Board and Jefferson Coun-
ty Board of Education.205  At the district court level, in the Seattle 
case, the trial judge identified three interests: 
(1) to promote the educational benefits of diverse school enrollments; 
(2) to reduce the potentially harmful effects of racial isolation by allow-
ing students the opportunity to opt out of racially isolated schools; and 
(3) to make sure that racially segregated housing patterns did not pre-
vent non-white students from having equitable access to the most popular 
over-subscribed schools.206 
The Jefferson County Board of Education also asserted racial balance 
and its benefits as a compelling government interest. 
The majority of the Justices supported the benefits of diversity as a 
compelling government interest under the strict scrutiny test.207  
However, Justice Thomas railed against the benefits of diversity as a 
compelling interest, stating that, “[s]cholars have differing opinions 
as to whether educational benefits arise from racial balancing.”208  He 
further claimed that “it would leave our equal protection jurispru-
dence at the mercy of elected officials evaluating the evanescent views 
of a handful of social scientists.”209  Accordingly, he concluded 
 
202 Id. at 122–23. 
203 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 89 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). 
204 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 709–11 (2007) (“The 
Courts of Appeals below upheld the [student assignment] plans.  We granted certiorari, 
and now reverse.”). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 786–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
207 Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This Court has recognized that the public interests at 
stake in such cases are ‘compelling.’”). 
208 Id. at 761 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
209 Id. at 766 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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“[e]ven if current social theories favor classroom racial engineering 
as necessary to solve the problems at hand, the Constitution en-
shrines principles independent of social theories.”210  Justice Breyer 
responded directly to Justice Thomas by noting: 
If we are to insist upon unanimity in the social science literature before 
finding a compelling interest, we might never find one.  I believe only 
that the Constitution allows democratically elected school boards to 
make up their own minds as to how best to include people of all races in 
one America.211 
Defining the role of social science data in constitutional judicial-
decisionmaking continues to divide the Supreme Court and constitu-
tional scholars.  In the education context, however, school districts 
must incorporate social science data when developing reforms.  The 
following sections describe the federal requirements for districts to 
use social science data and how the Supreme Court may accommo-
date such evidence when determining the constitutionality of educa-
tion policies. 
b.  Congress, the Department of Education and Social Science 
Evidence 
In the education context, the federal courts should consider social 
science research.212  For program development, teaching assessment, 
and tracking school progress, NCLB requires “scientifically based re-
search” as a guide to implementing best practices, which leaves edu-
cators to choose a preferred method.213  The standard is defined as 
“research that involves the application of rigorous, systematic, and ob-
jective procedures to obtain reliable and valid knowledge relevant to 
education activities and programs.”214  For example, Section 1114 re-
 
210 Id. at 780 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
211 Id. at 845 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
212 See HESS & PETRILLI, supra note 173, at 97 (“NCLB’s scientifically based research provi-
sions were intended not to require that all educational research adopt one particular me-
thodological approach, but that educational practice be guided by research that is rigor-
ous and reliable.”); Danielle Holley-Walker, Educating at the Crossroads:  Parents Involved, 
No Child Left Behind and School Choice, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 911, 920 (2008) (noting that in Par-
ents Involved, the Court’s plurality opinion “avoid[ed] the social science altogether” when 
it conflicted with school districts’ “good faith determination that there was enough evi-
dence to support adopting a race-conscious student assignment policy”). 
213 See Aaron J. Saiger, Legislating Accountability:  Standards, Sanctions, and School District Reform, 
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1655, 1724 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[NCLB] 
is . . . agnostic as to pedagogical method, with the very important exception that once dis-
tricts are identified as needing improvement they must implement ‘strategies based on 
scientifically based research.’”). 
214 No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7801 (2006). 
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quires schools to implement “school-wide programs” based on “strat-
egies that . . . use effective methods and instructional strategies that 
are based on scientifically based research that strengthen the core 
academic program in the school; increase the amount and quality of 
learning time . . .; and include strategies for meeting the educational 
needs of historically underserved populations.”215 
The Department of Education stands in full support of the con-
gressional mandate to rely on social science evidence when develop-
ing educational programs.  The What Works Clearinghouse, operated 
by the Department of Education, maintains a publicly available data-
base of scientifically based programs in effect across the country.216  
Additionally, President Obama’s administration implemented the 
Race to the Top program through the American Recovery Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009.217  School districts and schools participating in Race 
to the Top compete for education grants administered through the 
Department of Education.  Although proposals need not be scientifi-
cally based for approval, the competition encourages educators to 
replicate programs already proven as effective.218  The science-to-
policy transition has undoubtedly been criticized for major programs 
charged to improve educational outcomes through the data; howev-
er, Congress set forth a standard that the Court should apply when 
assessing the credence to be given research for constitutional chal-
lenges.219 
 
215 Id. § 6314(b)(1)(B). 
216 About Us:  What Works Clearinghouse, INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., http://www.ies.ed.gov/
ncee/wwc/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (“[T]he What Works Clearinghouse 
(WWC) was created in 2002 to be a central and trusted source of scientific evidence for 
what works in education.”). 
217 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, §§ 14001–14013, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115, 279–286 (2009) (detailing the subsections of the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act related to the Race to the Top program). 
218 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009), available 
at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf (explaining the 
competitive nature of Race to the Top). 
219 Dan Liston et al., NCLB and Scientifically-Based Research:  Opportunities Lost and Found, 58 J. 
TCHR. EDUC. 99 (2007); Joseph L. Mahoney & Edward F. Zigler, Translating Science to Poli-
cy Under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001:  Lessons From the National Evaluation of the 21st-
Century Community Learning Centers, 27 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 282 (2006); Alan H. 
Schoenfeld, What Doesn’t Work:  The Challenge and Failure of the What Works Clearinghouse to 
Conduct Meaningful Reviews of Studies of Mathematics Curricula, 35 EDUC. RES. no.2, 13 
(2006); Dick Schutz, The Non-Impact of Reading First—Where to Go From Here, TCHRS C. REC., 
Feb. 12, 2009. 
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c.  A Doctrinal Solution 
The treatment of social science in the education context, as envi-
sioned by accepting quality education to be a recognized government 
interest, would require federal courts to give legislative bodies defe-
rence when filtering which social science evidence should or should 
not inform policy decisions.  This reliance on legislative deference 
should be distinguished from relying on the expert testimony of so-
cial scientists to sway constitutional decisions. 
The Brown litigation strategy and the Court’s opinion, unlike any 
previous constitutional dispute, incorporated social science as evi-
dence to prove the plaintiffs’ harm.220  Thurgood Marshall, persuaded 
by then-attorney Robert Carter, presented Dr. Kenneth Clark’s psy-
chological studies regarding the effects of segregated schools on a 
black student’s self-image.221  Justice Warren, in footnote eleven of the 
Brown opinion, cited to several social science studies on the psycho-
logical harms resulting from segregated schooling.222  The promi-
nence of social science in Brown inspired much legal scholarship on 
the interplay between law and society when determining constitu-
tional questions.  Even Brown proponents questioned whether social 
science should have played any role in reaching an otherwise sound 
decision. 
Rachel Moran, comparing the use of social science in Brown and 
Parents Involved in Community Schools, concludes that 
in Brown, research on the inescapable harms of segregation, even in dual 
school systems that had equalized, was a legislative fact.  It bore on the 
normative question at the heart of the Court’s constitutional dilemma:  
Could separate ever be equal?  In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District, studies on the benefits of diversity in elementary and 
secondary schools played an analogous role.  This research was deployed 
to support a normative commitment to color consciousness, not just as a 
remedy for past discrimination but as a bridge to a multiracial future.223 
She also observes that “[a] formalist approach requires courts to look 
to their judicial predecessors, not contemporary social scientists, to 
determine what the law should look like.”224 
A more general critique of social science in relation to constitu-
tional decisions argues that “[t]he Court has (1) misused or misap-
plied data when it believes the data will enhance the persuasiveness of 
 
220 KLUGER, supra note 50, at 315–21. 
221 Id. 
222 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). 
223 Moran, What Counts as Knowledge, supra note 155, at 533 (citations omitted). 
224 Id. at 537. 
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its opinions; (2) ignored or rejected data despite its assertion of em-
pirically testable statements; and (3) disparaged data when the re-
search does not support its views.  In some cases, it has done all 
three.”225 
Under federal constitutional review, if the scientific research re-
lied upon by either party does not meet NCLB’s standard, then the 
Court should not allow the evidence.  Social scientists testify as trial 
experts, and social scientists help to inform legislative decisions.  Pol-
icy decisions made on the district and state levels using scientifically-
based research, as contemplated under NCLB, should be treated as 
though based on legislative fact.  In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Federal Communications Commission, the Court set forth its test for de-
termining the constitutionality of congressional statutes based on the 
legislature’s “predictive judgments.”226  The deference given Congress 
leaves the Court to consider whether “‘in formulating its judgments, 
Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evi-
dence.’”227  The Court concedes that the deference permitted Con-
gress emanates from the institution being “far better equipped than 
the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing 
upon legislative questions.”228  Moreover, the Court recognizes a “re-
spect for [Congress’s] authority to exercise the legislative power.”229  
Courts should bestow this same respect on school districts that use re-
search-based models to develop quality education programs for clos-
ing the achievement gap. 
B.  The Inevitability of Race in Education Reform 
The Court’s overemphasis on race is proving detrimental to the 
broader goal of quality education in the public system.  The Supreme 
Court’s more recent precedents apply a monotone analysis to educa-
tion reforms—one that is historical and that fails to recognize how 
other factors influence academic performance.230  A cohesive frame-
work, with an epicenter of quality education, links the purpose be-
hind assigning tiered levels of scrutiny to varying classifications and 
 
225 Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman:  The Supreme Court’s Continuing 
Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279, 293 (1995) (footnote 
omitted). 
226 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997). 
227 Turner, 520 U.S. at 195 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S 622, 666 (1994)). 
228 Turner, 520 U.S. at 195 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S at 665) (internal quotations omitted). 
229 Id. at 196. 
230 See Jordan M. Steiker, Brown’s Descendants, 52 HOW. L.J. 583, 603 (2009) (describing re-
cent precedential cases that uniformly agree all racial classifications are intolerable). 
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contemporary reform goals.  A focus on quality education also allays 
the concerns of education policy-makers attempting to reconcile fed-
eral constitutional interpretations and myriad legislative obligations. 
Resurrecting broader equality arguments will open room for edu-
cational experts to explore solutions that may be forbidden under 
current law.  As the pre-Brown legal strategy unfolded in the Supreme 
Court, the law evolved to recognize how a state’s attempt to provide 
objective equal resources did not wholly address more comprehensive 
equality goals; instead, an “intangible” component factored into satis-
fying the equality standards expressed in Brown.231  Offsetting the ef-
fects of these intangible factors forces us to consider categories 
beyond race. 
1. NCLB’s Disaggregated Reporting Requirement 
Social scientists acknowledge race, gender and socioeconomic sta-
tus as inextricable factors hindering the academic performance of 
“disadvantaged” students.232  On the other hand, the judiciary subor-
dinates gender and socioeconomic status to race in reviewing the 
constitutionality of education policy.233  Federal legislation places the 
classifications on separate planes for remedial purposes but not ac-
countability.  Federal equal protection doctrine should incorporate 
the state’s definition of quality education as a government interest.  
This change will signify recognition of our broadest goal to educate 
all Americans with the requisite sensitivity to local circumstances. 
Congress’s definition of disadvantaged or at-risk children is con-
stantly in flux for funding purposes—while the Court is stuck with 
race and wealth classifications.  Periodically, through ESEA’s legisla-
tive history, Congress has expanded the categories eligible to be con-
sidered disadvantaged under the statute.  Now, under NCLB, Title I 
seeks to achieve its purpose by “meeting the educational needs of 
low-achieving children in our Nation’s highest-poverty schools, li-
mited English proficient children, migratory children, children with 
disabilities, Indian children, neglected or delinquent children, and 
 
231 See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that 
the University of Oklahoma violated a student’s equal protection rights by imposing se-
gregated conditions under which African-American students were to receive their educa-
tion); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950) (discussing how the newly opened law 
school for African Americans in Texas did create “substantial equality in the educational 
opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the state”). 
232 Robinson, supra note 24, at 320, 327 n.325. 
233 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 710, 719 (2007); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
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young children in need of reading assistance.”234  The statement goes 
on to address the achievement gap between “minority and nonminor-
ity students, and between disadvantaged children and their more ad-
vantaged peers.”235 
Prior to NCLB, state-level reforms often sought to track school 
performance based on the entire student population.236  This method 
overlooked the nuances necessary to improve education for particu-
lar disadvantaged groups.  As Congress moved away from simply con-
tributing funds, it implemented statutes to prevent segregation and 
ensure steps were taken to provide a quality public education to all 
students, including racial and ethnic minorities, the impoverished, 
English-language learners, and the learning disabled.  Under NCLB, 
schools must report their student population’s performance on stan-
dardized tests in the following categories:  “ethnic and racial groups, 
low-income students, students with disabilities, and students with li-
mited English proficiency.”237 
2. Race and State Adequate Education Goals 
Many scholars understand, study, and measure academic perfor-
mance in elementary and secondary education based on identifiable 
groups.  Furthermore, our approach to developing effective educa-
tion reforms requires an appreciation for how protected traits inter-
sect to affect a child’s performance in public schools.  Accordingly, 
the Court’s antidiscrimination doctrine and discrete categorization of 
traits undermines the work done by education experts to tailor pro-
grams and allocate funding.  By recognizing a category of at-risk stu-
dents receiving subpar educational services, the Supreme Court 
would align its Fourteenth Amendment analysis with the challenges 
and expectations borne upon educators. 
Under their respective state constitutional education clauses and 
equal protection clauses, state supreme courts have recognized the 
need to address racial isolation and race imbalance in public schools 
as a component of quality education.  In Bustop v. Board of Education of 
Los Angeles, the Supreme Court gave sway to California’s interpreta-
tion of its state constitution in permitting a busing plan for Los An-
geles Unified School District designed to bring about greater dese-
 
234 No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2) (2006). 
235 Id. § 6301 (3). 
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237 Id. at 29, 35. 
708 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
gregation.238  Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist concluded that 
state courts “are free to interpret the Constitution of the State to im-
pose more stringent restrictions on the operation of a local school 
board.”239  He added that “[w]hile I have the gravest doubts that the 
Supreme Court of California was required by the United State Consti-
tution to take the action that it has taken in this case, I have very little 
doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action.”240 
In Morean v. Board of Education of Montclair, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey held that a school district “need [not] close its eyes to ra-
cial imbalance in its schools which, though fortuitous in origin, 
presents much the same disadvantages as are presented by segregated 
schools.”241  Citing the state’s constitution and Brown, the court 
reached this conclusion on the reasoning that New Jersey schools 
must “maintain a sound educational system by the furnishment of 
suitable school facilities and equal educational opportunities.”242 
In Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, the Washington 
Supreme Court allowed the school board deference in crafting a de-
segregation plan aimed at alleviating de facto racial discrimination in 
the public schools.243  Similarly, in Crawford v. Board of Education of Los 
Angeles, the Supreme Court of California once again permitted the 
use of race under its state constitution.  The court held that “public 
school districts bear an obligation under the state Constitution to 
undertake reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation, 
regardless of the cause of such segregation.”244 
Finally, in Sheff v. O’Neill, the Supreme Court of Connecticut con-
sidered racial isolation as an educational feature appropriate for re-
dress under the state’s constitution.245  Sheff marks the beginning of 
the proposed fourth wave of state finance litigation reform, which re-
cognizes the need for race-conscious policies in resolving educational 
disparities.246  Reflecting upon Sheff, James Ryan suggests that ade-
quate education rights, under state constitutions, are “broad enough 
 
238 439 U.S. 1380 (1978). 
239 Id. at 1382. 
240 Id. at 1383. 
241 Morean v. Bd. of Educ. of Montclair, 200 A.2d 97, 100 (N.J. 1964). 
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243 495 P.2d 657, 661–62 (Wash. 1972). 
244 551 P.2d 28, 42 (Cal. 1976). 
245 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
246 Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1361–75; Bowman, supra note 153, at 57; Far-
mer, supra note 23, at 463–64; McMillan, supra note 153, at 1896–1902; Morgan, supra 
note 153, at 165–68. 
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to encompass racial and socioeconomic integration.”247  Here, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court recognized racial isolation as a problem 
linked to insufficient funding; thus, it held that these students’ suf-
fered disparate educational opportunities.248  However, race-conscious 
policies implemented in response to state-judicial mandates are vul-
nerable to attack under the federal equal protection doctrine.249  Stu-
dents with disabilities, language issues, poor students, and those at-
tending schools that are racially isolated require more money to 
educate at an adequate level.250  The Fourteenth Amendment should 
allow states to craft policies based on their citizens’ myriad special 
needs—an antisubordination framework permits the flexibility 
needed to assess these fluid concerns.251  The Court’s equal protec-
tion doctrine may accommodate this subjectivity by recognizing quali-
ty education, as interpreted under a state’s education clause, to be a 
compelling government interest. 
In analyzing Brown and subsequent desegregation cases, Reva Sei-
gel identifies antisubordination as “the conviction that it is wrong for 
the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status 
of historically oppressed groups.”252  Under an antisubordination 
framework, policymakers may implement race-conscious laws when 
necessary to redress a harm and its resulting adverse effects.253  On the 
other hand, anticlassification theorists focus on the government cate-
gory invoked by a law as opposed to the underlying harm to be re-
dressed pursuant to the state action.254  More recently, Rachel Moran 
has proposed that “[a]ny recognition of schools as a place to build 
complex, flexible, and dynamic identities has been hampered by the 
rigid dialectic between an anti-classification and an anti-
subordination Constitution, a dialectic that in turn has reified 
 
247 James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 309 (1999). 
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race.”255  She suggests that, in the education context, “culture-race can 
create a positive, autonomous space for identity-building in a world 
no longer organized along oppositional, binary racial lines.”256 
The federal and state governing bodies of public education rec-
ognize racial classifications as part and parcel in achieving quality 
education goals.  The following section discusses federal executive-
level and state-level initiatives to direct resources towards the quality 
education of Latino students.  This focus emanates from the increase 
of Latino populations in the United States, particularly in certain 
geographic regions.  In the United States, one in every five public 
school children claims a Latino background.257  While opponents res-
ist the allocation of public funds to one group, as identified by a pro-
tected classification, quality education goals require these reforms in 
closing the achievement gap. 
C.  The Cooperative Effort to Educate Latino Americans 
1.  The Executive Branch Embraces Demographic Shifts, Community, and 
Local Control 
Communication between policymakers and the community re-
mains a key component to successful reform.  Professors Amanda 
Broun and Wendy Puriefoy argue that “inclusion of the public voice 
is an important element of the public engagement framework be-
cause the voice of the community has been historically excluded from 
the debate, resulting in reform that is rarely system-wide and even 
more rarely sustained.”258  In Parents Involved, Justice Breyer opined 
that 
the law often leaves legislatures, city councils, school boards, and voters 
with a broad range of choice, thereby giving “different communities” the 
opportunity to “try different solutions to common problems and gravitate 
toward those that prove most successful or seem to them best to suit their 
individual needs.”259 
 
255 Moran, Rethinking Race, supra note 83, at 1358. 
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Education reform is constantly in flux because the demographics 
of inner city districts and the federal influence over public education 
continue to change.  The Civil Rights Project at the University of Cali-
fornia reported increased suburban diversity in Indiana due to an in-
crease in the Latino student population and first time “majority-
minority” ratios in Abilene, Texas, based on an increase in Latino 
student enrollment.260  Over an eighteen-month period, the White 
House conducted a listening tour around the country to develop 
strategies for improving public education services provided in Latino 
communities.261  In October 2010, President Obama signed an execu-
tive order that “calls for the establishment of a presidential advisory 
commission on Hispanic education and a federal interagency work-
ing group on how to improve the education and lives of Latinos.”262  It 
also aims to “support communities to share best practices in the edu-
cation of Hispanic students and to strengthen public and private 
partnerships.”263 
2. State Officials Embrace Demographic Shifts and Community 
School officials must consider an array of characteristics and social 
circumstances, cued to their population, when crafting education 
policies.264  Race will inevitably enter the equation for many states and 
urban districts.  The Court’s current Fourteenth Amendment analysis 
could deter policymakers’ willingness to experiment in a reform cli-
mate that encourages innovation and a focus on particular minority 
groups.  In Plyler, Justice Brennan explained that 
[t]he initial discretion to determine what is “different” and what is “the 
same” resides in the legislature of the States.  A legislature must have sub-
stantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the 
nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns 
both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical 
ability of the State to remedy every ill.265 
Local officials deserve some leeway in observing and rectifying prob-
lems in their states and districts.  Following NCLB and President Ob-
ama’s lead, New Mexico’s Hispanic Education Act seeks to close the 
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achievement gap between Latino students and their white and Asian 
peers.  It is the first state education legislation in the country focused 
exclusively on improving performance for these students.266  In New 
Mexico, Latino students compose 56% of the public school students 
and only 56% graduate as compared to 71% of white students.267  The 
Hispanic Education Act, among other features, creates a liaison to 
the state’s public education department charged with developing pol-
icies, consulting with the districts, and communicating with an advi-
sory council.268  The statute also includes reporting requirements to 
track progress on closing the gap.269  A spokeswoman for the New 
Mexico Public Education Department offers that “the main thing 
[the Hispanic Education Act] did was formalize community engage-
ment and the community voice in crafting public policy.”270  The sta-
tute aims to improve student performance by incorporating a cultu-
rally based curriculum and increasing parent involvement.271 
In Horne v. Flores, decided during the Supreme Court’s 2009 term, 
parents from Arizona’s Nogales School District challenged whether 
the state fulfilled its duty under the Equal Educational Opportunities 
Act, to appropriately transition Spanish-speaking students into the 
mainstream classroom.272  The Court’s decision hinged on a proce-
dural issue, which brought to light substantive matters regarding the 
best approach for educating English learning students, state and local 
deference, and NCLB requirements.  The Horne v. Flores litigation 
commenced over ten years ago.  In 2000, the presiding federal dis-
trict court declared that the school district’s ELL program violated 
federal mandates due to funding deficiencies.273  Several years later, 
the state legislature approved a funding increase.274  In response, cer-
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tain state actors sought a Rule 60(b)(5) motion in the district court, 
arguing that changes in the facts and law required it to revisit the 
previous judgment.275  In 2009, the Supreme Court passed judgment 
on the motion’s legitimacy.276  Although not definitively deciding the 
motion, the Court provided invaluable insight on relevant considera-
tions in the education context. 
First, the Court determined that “appropriate action,” as required 
in the statute, must be defined by the state as indicated in the sta-
tute.277  Second, the Court concluded that the state’s decision to im-
plement an English immersion methodology over a bilingual educa-
tion methodology fell within the state’s discretion in light of social 
science research.278  Third, the Court found NCLB’s governance over 
standards for ELL education presented a “changed circumstance” 
under the procedural rule because it caused programmatic reforms, 
affected federal funding of ELL educational programs, required as-
sessments and reports on program improvements, and demonstrated 
greater federal involvement in education reform.279 
In Horne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held out a measured defe-
rence to legislative bodies.  This same deference should apply to local 
school districts and states that are adjusting to the “changed circums-
tance” of closing the achievement gap between at-risk students and 
their peers, improving education in Latino communities, and devel-
oping research-based programs that inevitably use protected classifi-
cations. 
D.  Intersectionality:  The Complicated Dynamics to Explaining Academic 
Underperformance 
In lieu of federal courts controlling the boundaries for education 
reform, the varying educational needs based on a district’s demo-
graphics support deference to local control and the incorporation of 
state constitutional interpretations with regards to defining a quality 
education.  Even if local systems are broken, by expanding the consti-
tutionality test, we recognize that many failed institutions contribute 
to the condition of public education.  In Rodriguez, the Court con-
fronted the difficulties with education quality, stating that “in view of 
the infinite variables affecting the educational process, [no system] 
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can . . . assure equal quality of education except in the most relative 
sense.”280  This may be a true observation, but the Court’s categorical 
treatment of these “infinite variables” restricts school districts from 
crafting solutions that address the intersectionality of a child’s back-
ground.  In the context of education, I agree that race contributes to 
explanations of the achievement gap, but if we were to eliminate rac-
ism today, many poor people would still exist in the United States.  
And, according to the research, both race and class contribute to the 
education problems facing public schools. 
The only desegregation case that addresses the inextricable link 
between race and socioeconomic status is Hobson v. Hansen, decided 
in the federal district court for the District of Columbia.281  The dis-
trict court’s willingness to simultaneously consider both traits affect-
ing quality education facilitated a comprehensive analysis penetrating 
issues not addressed under an antidiscrimination lens with tiered 
scrutiny levels.  As the following review of Judge Skelly Wright’s opi-
nion demonstrates, more nuanced issues related to quality education, 
such as tracking and housing patterns, may reveal themselves when 
federal courts concern themselves with more than assignment based 
on race.  For example, Kristi Bowman proposes a multi-factor socioe-
conomic approach for Latino/a students which accounts for the 
“student’s English language speaking skills, whether English is spo-
ken at home, and whether a student lives in public housing.”282 
In Hobson, the parents of black and socio-economically disadvan-
taged children challenged the neighborhood school plan imple-
mented by school officials in response to the Court’s ruling in Bolling 
v. Sharpe, the companion case to Brown.283  The district court defined 
the issue as whether the school district “unconstitutionally deprive[d] 
the District’s [black] and poor public school children of their right to 
equal educational opportunity with the District’s white and more af-
fluent public school children.”284  In drawing connections between 
race and socioeconomic status, the district court acknowledged how 
the city’s housing patterns were changing and could be traced along 
racial lines; therefore, the neighborhood school policy caused the ra-
cial and socioeconomic demographics of residential areas to replicate 
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themselves in classrooms.285  The court based its assessment of the ur-
gent need for remedial action on 
the degree to which the poor and the [black] must rely on the public 
schools in rescuing themselves from their depressed cultural and eco-
nomic condition, and also our common need of the schools to serve as 
the public agency for neutralizing and normalizing race relations in the 
country.  With these interests at stake, the court must ask whether the vir-
tues stemming from the . . . [education policy] are compelling or ade-
quate justification for the considerable evils of de facto segregation which 
adherence to this policy breeds.286 
The court then went one step further to acknowledge that not on-
ly did the district’s plan segregate students between schools, but the 
district’s tracking system resegregated integrated schools by dispro-
portionately assigning black and poor children to lower tracks.287  In 
reviewing the track system, the district court addressed the proposi-
tion that the system adversely affects black and poor children to a 
greater extent than white middle-class students.288  The court ac-
cepted that the track system “as presently practiced in the District of 
Columbia school system is a denial of equal educational opportunity 
to the poor and a majority of the [blacks] attending school in the na-
tion’s capital.”289  With this in mind, the court decided to examine the 
track system “in theory and in reality.”290  The court considered evi-
dence showing the track system’s deficiencies with respect to poor 
children and black students, who composed the majority demograph-
ic in the public school system under attack.291  The court labeled a 
child’s socioeconomic background as a “shorthand way of identifying 
those backgrounds that are more or less conducive to becoming a 
successful student.”292 
The equal protection doctrine can and should account for the 
myriad factors affecting students in any particular school district 
across the country.  The Seattle School District implemented a plan 
that considered factors beyond the student’s choice:  where a stu-
dent’s sibling attends school, the student’s race, and the school’s 
proximity to the student’s home.293  Because race entered into the 
equation at all, the Court fixed its attention on applying its strict scru-
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tiny analysis with no regard for how the other factors considered in 
placing students may have affected the policy’s constitutionality.294  
Justice Breyer observed that race “constitute[s] but one part of plans 
that depend primarily upon other, nonracial elements. . . . In fact, 
the defining feature of both plans is greater emphasis upon student 
choice.”295  Moreover, scholars following desegregation and school 
finance litigation trends persuasively argue for policies providing 
more money based on student need, even if this may require race-
conscious policies, combined with renewed efforts to racially and 
ethnically integrate schools.296  Social scientists also show that many 
factors play into determining a student’s academic success.297 
As school administrators respond to the needs unique to their lo-
cale, the Court’s protected classifications mutate into something not 
contemplated by the discrete, insular classes identified in the Carolene 
Products and Brown opinions.298  For example, whereas challenges to 
educate black male students plague many urban districts, this prob-
lem does not exist in some regions. In Appalachia, the education 
problem revolves around communities populated by white students.  
The end result may be for districts to rely less on race, opting for less 
effective alternatives, when correcting academic performance is-
sues.299  Some scholars suggest socioeconomic integration programs, 
which to this point have been immune from federal constitutional 
challenge but may be less effective than programs accounting for a 
student’s race.300  Moreover, socioeconomic integration encounters 
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geographic hurdles similar to race integration within urban districts, 
as “14% of school districts nationwide do not have enough middle-
class schools to achieve socioeconomic integration.”301 
A quality education standard permits districts to tailor policies fit-
ting their constituency, whether poor Latino students make up the 
majority population or impoverished white students in Appalachia 
need special educational programs.  The flexibility to consider the 
whole student is an invaluable condition to successful reform. 
CONCLUSION 
In its effort to eradicate any consideration of race in educational 
policies, the Court is undermining federal and local efforts for educa-
tional quality.  Judicial deference to educational policymakers, even 
when the policy is imperfect, is the best hope for achieving educa-
tional quality. 
Brown v. Board of Education fought for quality public education.  
Choosing the appropriate remedy fell into the hands of federal 
courts due to pubic resistance when Brown outlawed a pervasive social 
norm.  The Court made clear, however, that their remedial authority 
entailed restraints not applicable to state actors.  Moreover, the Court 
also recognized that the state’s primacy over public education matters 
rendered the federal court’s involvement temporary.  The current 
Court’s approach to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment direct-
ly challenges the work of civil rights groups aspiring for an enforcea-
ble and defined quality norm.  On the state level, legislation and pol-
icy incorporate the race and socioeconomic status of students in 
developing reform for quality education.  These proxies, no matter 
how draconian and simplistic, account for the myriad factors recog-
nized by social science experts as affecting a child’s academic per-
formance, yet we are incapable of considering these characteristics 
under the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 
The Supreme Court, when applying its equal protection doctrine, 
needs to reset its priorities.  Although federal courts reject quality 
education as a government interest sufficient to satisfy heightened 
scrutiny, education claims have always centered around this goal.  
The historical background to Brown reflects a community concerned 
about the educational opportunities provided to their children.  
Children enter school with the desire to learn and a naive trust in the 
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system to provide them a quality education.  Many parents enroll 
their children in public school with the same degree of blind trust in 
the system.  Public education provides a foundational staging ground 
to help children attain their most far-fetched dreams.  The primary 
responsibility for ensuring such promising results rests in the hands 
of state legislatures and local school officials.  The decision to imple-
ment education reforms, when sanctioned through state constitu-
tional education clauses and federal legislation, must not be pre-
vented through applying the Court’s anticlassification standard for 
the sake of an aspirational colorblind society. 
 
 
 
